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Abstract (English) 
 
 
This master thesis deals with migration policy at EU level as well as at national level. 
Two case studies are chosen for this purpose: Germany and Italy. They are interesting 
cases for this work because of the different experience in migration they have and because 
of their country specifics. At the same time, they are both EU member states and are 
taking part in the European integration. 
 
This work looks at different theories trying to explain the proccess of migration. 
Furthermore, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism underlines the role of the states in 
the integration process and the role of their past experiences in the current developments. 
 
Irregular migration poses challenges to the member states as well as to the EU as a whole. 
This work will look not only on protection of the borders as a measure against it, but also 
on the influence of internal factors e.g. structure of the labor market and the welfare 
system. Informal economy attracts also irregular migrants. Compared to Germany the 
share of the Italian underground economy is bigger and plays a significant role for the 
flow of irregular migrants. The welfare state leads to increased demand on the labor 
market. Furthermore, this thesis dwells on measures against irregular migration on 
different stages: pre-entry, at the borders, detection and termination of the irregular stay. 
 
Parallel to the increasing creativity of smugglers the EU puts even more emphasis on the 
„fight against illegal immigration“. At the same time, member states are not ready to fully 
give up their sovereignty. This work looks at border control (e.g. FRONTEX) as well as 
further steps for establishment of common standards e. g. the Return Directive.  
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Abstract (German) 
 
Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit Migrationspolitik auf der EU- und nationaler 
Ebene. Zwei Fallbeispiele wurden zu diesem Zweck ausgewählt: Deutschland und Italien. 
Wegen ihrer unterschiedlichen Erfahrung mit Migration und ihrer spezifischen Situation 
stellen sie interessante Fälle für diese Arbeit dar. Zugleich sind sie EU-Mitgliedstaaten 
und nehmen an der europäischen Integration teil. 
 
Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit verschiedenen Theorien auseinander, die die 
Migrationsprozesse zu erklären versuchen. Weiters betont die Theorie des liberalen 
Intergovernmentalismus die Rolle der Staaten beim Integrationsprozess und die Rolle 
ihrer früheren Erfahrungen für die gegenwärtige Entwicklung.  
 
Irreguläre Migration stellt eine Herausforderung für die Mitgliedstaaten, sowie für die EU 
dar. Diese Arbeit wird sich nicht nur mit Grenz-Bewahrung als eine Maßnahme dagegen 
auseinandersetzen, sondern auch mit dem Einfluss interner Faktoren wie z.B. Struktur des 
Arbeitsmarkts und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Informelle Wirtschaft lockt auch irreguläre Migranten 
an. Im Vergleich zu Deutschland ist der Anteil der italienischen informellen Wirtschaft 
viel größer und hat eine wichtige Rolle für irreguläre Migrationsewegungen. Auch der 
Wohlfahrtsstaat hat eine Rolle für die Nachfrage des Arbeitsmarkts. Weiters beschäftigt 
sich die Masterarbeit mit Maßnahmen gegen irregulären Migration in verschiedenen 
Phasen: vor der Einreise, an der Grenze, Feststellung und Beendigung des irregulären 
Aufenthalts.   
 
Parallel zu der zunehmenden Kreativität der Schleuser verstärkt die EU weiter den 
„Kampf gegen illegale Migration“. Gleichzeitig sind die Mitglieder-Staaten nicht bereit 
ihre Souveränität vollkommen aufzugeben. Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Grenz-
Bewahrung (z.B. FRONTEX), so wie mit weiteren Schritten für die Etablierung 
gemeinsamer Standards, wie z.B. der Rückführungsrichtlinie.  
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Introduction 
In this master thesis I will deal with migration policy at EU level as well as at national 
level. In this context I consider the two EU member states Italy and Germany. News about 
migrants appears in the media very often. Many theories try to explain why migration 
happens; some of them underline economic reasons and other social and political factors. 
According to Castles and Miller (2009, p. 21), research on migration should be 
interdisciplinary. 
Migration is also occupying politicians at the EU level. According to Tomei (1997, p.15), 
the EU common migration policy started with the project for the Single Market. Other 
international treaties, such as the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Treaty deal with 
the movement of people in Europe. At this stage, the migration issue was still part of the 
sovereignty of the member states. An important step was made with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and later with the Treaties of Nizza and Lisbon, which transferred some 
responsibilities of the states to the EU level. 
According to Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, national governments still decide 
how far integration goes (in Puchala, 1999, p. 319). In addition to that, understanding 
domestic policy is connected to past legacies and current policies (see also Moravcsik, 
1993, p.481). Germany is dealing with migration since the 1950s. It started with the guest 
workers coming from countries like Turkey, Italy and Tunisia. After the Fall of the Berlin 
Wall this issue culminated in the high numbers of refugee-seekers. For many years 
Germany stated in its official documents that it is not a country of immigration. 
Compared to Germany, Italy has much less experience in immigration. Italy was a country 
of emigration until 1970. The foreign population in Italy rose to 2,5 million people in the 
1980s (Schierup, 2006, p.164) and now their number is about 30 million people (Bade, 
2001, p.105). Taking into account the different experience of Germany and Italy as 
immigration countries and, at the same time, their membership in the EU, both countries 
are an interesting combination for research. 
But still migration is a very broad topic and in this master thesis the case of irregular 
migration will be discussed. Most irregular migrants cross the border in a regular way, but 
then overstay their visa. Some of them are smuggled through the borders. This master 
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thesis will look at irregular migration and measures which Germany and Italy as EU 
member states undertook. 
Migrants have different background and immigration flows are complex, still there are 
some estimates about the number of irregular migrants. Statistics are important so that 
entry routes can be identified and measures against that kind of migration can be taken. 
According to Eurostat, there were 50.250 people irregularly staying in Germany in 2010. 
Many of them were coming from Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq and Serbia (Schneider, 2012, 
p.80). Politicians in Italy did not want to recognize that many of the migrants were not just 
temporarily staying and that they are going to be part of the future development in Italy. 
Home Office and Ministry issued their first report on migration in Italy just in 2007. 
Private research institutes started publishing statistical information long before the 
government did, e.g. Fondazione ISMU, Institutto Cataneo and authors like Emilio 
Reyneri from the University of Milan (Fasani, 2009, p.26).  
Germany and Italy try to prevent migration through pre-entry measures such as 
information campaigns about the risks of irregular migration and, on the other hand, 
further measures which aim at different stages of irregular migration – pre-entry, at the 
borders, detection of irregular status in the country and termination of the irregular status. 
Important actors for the formation of the national policies and measures include non-
governmental organizations, political parties as well as churches. Moravcsik calls this 
process national preference formation. Internal factors as labor market and welfare states 
also play a role for immigration flows.  
Irregular migration is often seen as a threat to security and as a challenge with regard to 
the EU-territorial borders. The EU is making border controls tougher in order to stop 
traffickers and smugglers, which makes them more creative for alternative routes  
(Boswell / Geddes, p.135). The European Agency FRONTEX carries out the management 
of the external borders and co-ordinates EU member states’ activities in implementing 
these measures. Additionally, the EU tries to regulate migration flows through co-
operation with the sending and transit countries. Another important measure is the 
adoption of the Return Directive, which introduced one procedure for all member states 
for the expulsion of irregular migrants. 
Still member states have different approaches against irregular migration. For example, 
Germany does not undertake large-scale regularizations, which took place in Italy. 
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Another important issue is the divergence between law and practice, which among other 
things strongly influences the structure of the labor market (Boswell / Geddes, 2011 
p.143). Irregular migrants are attracted by the possibility to work in the informal 
economy, which is easier in Italy than in Germany. 
An important question is what measures are taken to limit irregular migration and what 
the roles of the EU and the member states are. Furthermore, Germany and Italy are 
interesting cases for researching this issue because of their different experience with 
migration.  
Scientific interest 
News on people crossing the EU borders on boats, in truck compartments or planes appear 
very often in the media. Stories about their lives describe in detail the way they reached 
Europe and the difficulties they have with irregular status. The accute problem of irregular 
migration is reflected, on one hand, by the policy of the EU with its tendency to 
supranationalism and, on the other hand, by the policies and measures of the national 
governments. Italy is an interesting case for research because of its recent experience as 
country of immigration. Due to its geographical position, it is also exposed to a relatively big 
flow of immigration. Germany has more years of experience in immigration although it took 
it longer to recognize that it is a country of immigration. I will try to put both countries in the 
EU context and discuss the interaction between the governments and the EU. 
Structure 
In the theoretical part I will discuss the liberal intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik, who sees 
the states as the main propeller of integration, but not as „black boxes“ which one could not 
understand. This means that there are national actors important for the formation of the 
national policy. Economical and socio-political theories help explain migration. Neoclassical 
theory sees the individual as the main decision-maker for immigrating and new economics of 
labor migration describes the social group as the unit of analysis. According to Castles and 
Miller (2009, p. 21), migration is a multifacetted issue and it could not be explained with just 
one theory. Therefore, I consider socio-economic theories such as migration networks and 
migration systems theory focusing not only on receiving countries, but also on sending 
countries. 
The Common Migration Policy of the EU, its formation and development are also 
observed in this part. Furthermore, the definition of an irregular migrant is an important issue 
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for this master thesis. Therefore, I consider the definition in the Schengen Border Code as 
well as in documents from researchers like Heckmann, Geddes and Riedel. 
The developments of the migration policy in Germany and Italy are discussed in the second 
part. The main actors in building national preference are observed in connection with 
Moravcsik’s liberal integovernmentalism. Special sections are dedicated to measures which 
Germany and Italy undertook against irregular migration. They take place on different stages: 
pre-entry, entry, stay and termination of irregularity. One chapter treats problems and 
measures of the EU against irregular migration.  
In the end, I summarize the findings, particularly the different national approaches of 
Germany and Italy in the context of the EU. Furthermore, I check the hypotheses which are 
posed in the beginning of the thesis. 
Methodology 
I look at the development of EU migration policy as well as at the national migration policies 
of Germany and Italy (in a historically descriptive way). Furthermore, I treat on the measures 
taken by Italy and Germany and their co-operation with the European Union. 
Sources: The literature I used was primary and secondary. Among the most useful articles 
were those of the research project CLANDESTINO, as well as articles from EMN (European 
Migration Network) and SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Literature in English and 
German was used for this master thesis. Literature about Italy in English or German turned 
out to be rather scarce. 
Issues and Questions 
1. What is irregular migration? 
2. What are the ways for getting irregular? 
3. How did the EU migration policy begin and how did it develop? 
4. What is the development of migration policies in Germany and Italy? 
5. Which actors are important for defining the national policy in this field? 
6. Which are the main issues connected to irregular migration at national and European 
level? 
7. Which measures were taken for preventing irregular migration? 
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Hypotheses 
H1: Measures against irregular migration comprise border controls as well as regulations of 
labor market and co-operation with the sending countries. 
H2: The approaches of Germany and Italy (both of them EU member states) towards irregular 
migrants differ due to their different experience in this field, their different labor market and 
their geographical position. 
H3: In the field of migration states still want to keep their sovereignty and are unwilling to 
delegate all their powers to the EU. 
 6 
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PART I 
1 Liberal intergovernmentalism 
1.1 Comparison 
1.1.1 Comparison with realism 
According to Steinholder (Steinholder, 2005, p. 167), Moravcsik's contribution to 
European Integration theory is often seen as realistic. As a state-centred theory, liberal 
intergovernmentalism shares a common view with realism, that when it comes to an 
integration process states are examined as closed entity. The governments of the member 
states are the connection between the inner and the international level. For making 
progress in the integration process it is important that the leading member states have 
diverging interests. When this is present interstate negotiations may lead to adopting 
common rules, which are also in favour of the national interests.  
What distinguishes liberal intergovernmentalism from realism is that national interests are 
formed not by distribution of power between the states, but by national preference 
formation process. Which interests will gain influence and will be represented by the 
country at international level depends on the political system and the distribution of power 
between the competing social actors (Steinholder, 2005, p. 174). 
1.1.2 Comparison with institutionalism 
Puchala tries to explain liberal intergovernmentalism through differentiating it from 
institutionalism (Puchala, 1999, p.318) Although international integration may rest on 
agreements between the governments, once these institutions were created, their influence 
becomes stronger. One of the main reasons for that is their ability to manage information 
and their efficiency in problem-solving methods. The agents of the supranational 
institutions are political actors who direct these institutions. They aim at the welfare and 
the security of the international society which is under their jurisdiction. Their interest lies 
in increasing their power through increasing the authority of the institutions they direct. 
Although intergovernmentalists recognize that international institutions support the co-
operation between the member states, they are not seen as the main propeller of the 
integration. The leading role in this process is performed by the nation states. When 
national interests of the member states converge, integration moves forward. In addition to 
that, according to intergovernmentalists the bargaining power of the governments is 
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reflected in "the terms of international co-operation, the accompanying rules that guide it 
and the institutions that frame it" (Puchala, 1999, p.319). At the same time, they do not 
give up their sovereignty. In contrast to institutionalism, agents who are connected to the 
institutions have little power. The main actors are national governments and especially the 
governments of the major EU countries, heads of governments, heads of states and 
influential ministers. 
Institutionalists and intergovernmentalists have different explanations for the happenings 
during the period of the Cold War. For the former one, the influence of the supranational 
agents is deciding and for the latter group of researchers (represented by Moravcsik) the 
national governments and leaders have the leading role (Puchala, 1999, p.327). This gives 
another perspective on the role of European leaders like Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors 
and national leaders like Margaret Tatcher and Charles de Gaulles. In his book "The 
Choice for Europe" Moravcsik studied documents, memoirs and diaries and arguments 
that de Gaulles' diplomacy between 1954 and 1966 aimed at achieving French interests 
e.g. Common Agriculture Policy in the process of European economic integration 
(Moravcsik in Puchala, 1999, p.329). He calls this the Supranational bargaining theory, 
which has its basis in the neo-functional theory. It claims that supranational officials are 
very important for the integration process and they exercise leadership in the following 
ways: 
- by manipulation of information and ideas 
- by transaction costs for states 
- by their privileged access to information and ideas 
These factors allow them to initiate negotiations, to mediate among governments and to 
mobilize domestic groups (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 59). 
1.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism – core elements 
The core elements of this theory, according to Moravcsik, are: 
- rational state behaviour 
- liberal theory of national preference formation 
- intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiations 
1.2.1 Rational state behaviour 
The rationalist approach tries to explain the actors preferences and "the collective 
outcomes as a result of aggregated individual actions based on these preferences" 
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(Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 77). In contrast to realism and neo-realism, where states are 
seen as black boxes, according to liberal intergovernmentalism, states are aiming at 
certain goals, which are defined domestically. Foreign policy goals may change if the 
domestic interests change (Moravcsik, 1993, p.481). This could happen through the 
political conflict between societal groups which want to gain more political influence. 
Moravcsik explains this with the help of liberal theory of international relations, which 
has its focus on the relationships between state and society. Therefore, he underlines that 
understanding domestic policy is a precondition for understanding interstate relations. 
Moravcsik tries to find out how the preference building process is working and if 
economic or geopolitical interests have the leading role (liberal Theory); what the role of 
these preferences in interstate relations is (bargaining Theory) and why states give part 
of their sovereignty to international institutions (in Bieling, 2005, p. 177). 
1.2.2 National preference building 
Actors 
According to this theory, the state is not a homogenous agent, but a result from the 
different power relationships in the society. On the other hand, social actors are 
competing against each other in order to influence the decisions of the government 
(Moravcsik in Bieling, 2005, p.177). Moravcsik assumption is that the most important 
actors are "private individuals and voluntary associations with autonomous interests, 
interacting in civil society" (Moravcsik, 1993, p.483). On the other hand, politicians also 
have an important role as they determine state priorities and policies. The politicians are 
seen as part of the civil society at domestic and international level, which influences their 
identities and purposes. The interests of the groups are not fixed, but they vary according 
to the "net expected costs and benefits of potential foreign policies" (ibid.).  
Preferences 
Preferences are understood as comparing different alternatives of activities (ibid., p. 178). 
The preferences are not a result of the international activities or connections with other 
states. Moravcsik (1997, p. 517) calls also this a bottom-up view, in which individuals and 
societal groups are forming the politics. Although classifying national institutions and 
structures with lower rank, they still influence possibilities for societal actors to 
implement their preferences. When talking about preference formation it is also important 
to underline the main interest of the governments: to stay in power. Aiming at this, it is 
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important to have the support of voters, parties, interest groups, which transmit their views 
"through domestic institutions and practices of political representation" (Moravcsik, 1993, 
p.483). In this way, the author explains the emergence of the national interests that states 
represent at the international stage.  
A central moment in this theory is to find out which are the most important social 
groups, to define their relative influence in politics and to understand the reasoning for 
their preferences (Bieling, 2005, p.178). In order to define the leading groups, Moravcsik 
uses the theory of Mancur Olson to find an answer to the first question (ibid.). According 
to him, smaller groups are more influential, because they have more homogenous 
interests. Conversely, bigger groups have more diverging interests, and this makes it more 
difficult to exert powerful influence. He takes as an example the consumers' and 
producers' groups. He defines the producers (or employers) as the most influential group 
in the European integration especially in industry, agrarian policy and supply of services 
(ibid., p. 179). When interests in the groups are divided, the governments have also more 
freedom to act and vice versa (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 484) 
In this theory the geopolitical interests have a minor role in comparison with the 
economic ones: 
"We should see geopolitical rhetoric adapted to support economic objectives, not the 
reverse" (Moravcsik, 1998 cited in Bieling, 2005, p. 180) 
The explanation for intergovernmental co-operation, according to this theory, lies in 
economics (e.g. economic interdependence and externalities). Co-operation in the EU is 
aiming at market liberalization that could eliminate trade barriers and to support trade 
interests (ibid., p.179). In a situation where governments are interdependent, international 
policy externalities can arise. They are characterized through costs and benefits for a 
significant social group and the government does not have jurisdiction upon that group 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p. 485).  The author explains the incentives for co-operation through 
positive and negative externalities. In case of positive externalities (benefits), domestic 
policies benefit foreign groups and, at the same time, they strengthen national policies. 
Negative externalities (costs) happen when one government creates through its policy 
costs for another government and undermines its policies. In this case costs could be 
decreased through co-operation, when there are benefits (positive externalities), there is 
no big incentive for co-operation. 
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He defines two goals for this co-operation: reciprocal market liberalization, which 
creates the economic interdependence, and policy harmonisation, which tries to "assure 
the continued provision of public goods, for which the state is domestically responsible, 
such as socio-economic equality" (ibid., p. 486).  
Probability for co-operation 
When costs arise just for one government in the process, the government responsible for 
creating them may decide to "free ride on the domestic policies of their neighbours, rather 
than co-operate" (Moracvcsik, 1993, p. 486). Therefore, according to Moravcsik, a co-
operation is more probable when negative externalities arise for both governments. 
Another incentive for co-operation is the distribution of costs within and among states, 
which is not always even. Possible confrontation or co-operation between nations and 
societal groups may be predicted through analysing the net societal costs. On the other 
hand, if some powerful groups are disadvantaged by this co-operation, they might try to 
prevent it, although it brings profit to a big part of the society (ibid., p. 487). Other aspects 
which may affect preference formation and policy of co-operation or confrontation later 
are certainty and risk. If the "net costs and benefits of alternative policies are certain, 
significant and risky, individual citizens and firms have a strong incentive to mobilize 
politically" and vice versa (ibid., p. 487). On the other hand, for the achievement of 
international agreement, it is important that preferences of the domestic groups in 
different countries converge; otherwise co-ordination could be very difficult. 
Political co-operation 
Common foreign and security policy cannot be interpreted as a clear response to costs 
and benefits coming from economic interdependence (Moravcsik, 1993, p.494). As the 
results from the political co-operation are diffuse and uncertain, private producers let the 
political elites influence the policy at domestic level. On the other hand, the conducted 
policy is reasoned by ideologies and symbols. Having in mind this uncertainty of future 
costs and benefits, mobilizing interest groups is very difficult. This gives "leading 
executive and parliamentary politicians" the opportunity to influence through their 
"ideologies and personal commitments" the government policy (e.g. de Gaulle, Thatcher). 
Activities based on ideological terms may also be dominant when the implications after 
decisions cannot be predicted. The author also mentions that large, self-sufficient 
countries are more unwilling to give up sovereignty to supranational institutions than 
smaller countries.  
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1.2.3 Intergovernmental bargaining theory 
The core element of the bargaining theory is that co-operation "depends on the relative 
bargaining power of the actors" (Schimmelfennig, 2004, p.77). Information and the 
benefits of a certain agreement define the bargaining power. For example, actors with 
more information could influence negotiations to their advantage and actors that do not 
need very much a special agreement could not be co-operative and in that way they might 
want concession from the other countries. 
According to Moravcsik, integration happened because of rational decisions of the 
national governments (Steinhilber, 2005, p.180). A precondition for that was the 
convergence of preferences between the most powerful member states (Great Britain, 
Germany and France). In addition to that, countries take part in negotiations for 
integration voluntarily (Moravcsik in Bieling, 2005, p.181). They decline the use of war, 
and even imposing economic sanctions to one another happens only in rare occasions 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p. 498).  A second assumption is that governments have lots of 
information in the bargaining situation. They communicate at low cost and they are aware 
of the preferences of their counterparts. In addition to that, negotiations within the 
European Community (EC) have low transacton costs and could last longer, which allows 
the states to make different offers "at relatively little cost". Third, once the government 
has adopted the preferences of a certain societal group and it represents them at the 
international stage, the preferences cannot be changed any more by the inner actors. 
Though governments are seen as gate-keepers between inner political and international 
field, they are analysed as homogeneous actors from this moment on (Bieling, 2005, p. 
181). At the same time, states cannot influence the national preference formation process 
in other countries. 
According to Moravcsik, two problems arise in connection to bargaining: efficiency of 
negotiations and distributional implications of interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 
1999, p.51). The negotiation process may be accompanied by threats, withholding of 
information and other activities that could make the co-operation difficult. International 
institutions may help in these cases through proposing agreements and establishing rules 
for decision-making. The second problem refers to the distribution of costs and benefits 
from a possible co-operation.  
Moravcsik defines certain bargaining factors under the following circumstances: 
 13 
"The more intensely governments desire agreement, the more concessions and the 
greater effort they will expend to achieve it. The greater the potential gains for a 
government from co-operation, as compared to its best alternative policy, the less risk 
of non-agreement it is willing to assume and, therefore the weaker its bargaining 
power over the specific terms of agreement" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 499). 
 
In this situation he qualifies three possible actions: "(1) unilateral policy alternatives 
("threats of non-agreement"), (2) alternative coalitions ("threats of exclusion") and (3) the 
potential for compromise and linkage" (ibid.). 
(1) unilateral policy alternatives ("threats of non-agreement") – If the alternative 
policy gives a perspective for bigger benefits, then governments are more inclined to 
decline co-operation. There is a range ("set") of possible agreements, in which all the 
gains from an agreement at one end go to one government and at the other end of this 
alternative all the gains belong to other government. It is possible that governments may 
reach an agreement in this interval. One basic alternative is the unilateral policy. In this 
case governments can use only the threat of non-co-operation. Giving examples of trade 
and public good policies, Moravcsik concludes that "large, prosperous, relatively self-
sufficient countries" have more influence in negotiations than smaller countries, which 
have more interest than the bigger ones in a future joint agreement (ibid., p. 500). 
Therefore, having a weaker bargaining power and being dependent on their foreign 
governments the smaller countries are more likely to make concessions (Moravcsik, 1999, 
p. 61). This means: the more these states want a certain agreement, the more they are 
ready to give more in order to get what they want. 
Some agreements are negotiated on the principle of the lowest common denominator. It 
means that the range of possible agreements is bounded by the preferences of the least 
forthcoming government, whose position is closest to the status quo. One outcome of this 
situation might lead to the adoption of the lowest possible common standard. Another 
possibility is that higher standards are adopted than those prevailing domestically. 
Moravcsik gives an example with the adoption of higher environmental and public health 
standards (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 502). 
(2) alternative coalitions ("threats of exclusion") – Sometimes making an alternative 
coalition is a better alternative to an agreement than unilateral policy. In this way some 
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states face exclusion, which increases the bargaining power of the group aiming at 
coalition. The coalition may involve states which are not part of the European integration, 
or leave some members out of the agreement: "multi-speed Europe" (ibid., p.503). The 
threat of exclusion, according to him, might be more powerful than the threat of unilateral 
non-co-operation. He gives an example with Great Britain which by creating the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) tried to respond to the threat of exclusion (the formation 
of the Common Market, 1950s – 1960s). This attempt seemed unsuccessful, and finally 
Great Britain applied later for a full EC membership (ibid., p. 503). On the other hand, he 
argues that alternative coalitions not always create costs (negative externalities) for the 
excluded states. If these states have benefits (positive externalities) from the agreement 
even though they are not parties to it, they might not have an incentive to join it. 
Moravcsik defines this as free-riding (1999, p. 65). In the opposite case, if exclusion 
brings them costs, they may want to join it.  
(3) compromise, linkage and side-payments – If there is uncertainty during the 
negotiations (breakdown of negotiations, time pressure), Moravcsik sees a tendency for 
“disproportionate” concessions. This means governments that expect to lose more of an 
unsuccessful agreement are ready to make more concessions in comparison with 
governments in the contrary position.  
Linkage may be most successful when governments have differential preferences on 
different issues (Moravcsik, 1999, p.65). In this case, one government can make 
concessions in an area that is not so important for it and thus gain concessions in another 
area of interest which is not so important for the second government. Such linkages may 
help in having better results from negotiations. According to the author, in this way the 
major disadvantages of bargaining on the basis of unilateral and coalitional alternatives 
may be overcome: “namely that governments tend to have the least bargaining power on 
precisely those issues which are relatively most important to them" (Moravcsik, 1993, 
p.505). The main problem may be the domestic opposition. Having in mind the 
importance of domestic costs and benefits Moravcsik makes some further remarks. Minor 
issues where domestic groups do not have intense preferences are more likely to be used 
for linkages. Second, linkages are more likely to happen in the final stages of bargaining 
as a mean for balancing gains and losses on issues on which parties are close to "net 
beneficiaries" in comparison with issues in which the states are losers or winners. In 
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addition to that, linkages are most likely to happen "between closely related issues" (ibid., 
p.506). And fourth, domestic side-payment to disadvantaged groups may avoid creating 
losers' groups at domestic level (ibid., p. 506). 
1.2.3.1 The role of the institutions 
Institutions are important, but the states have the leading role in the integration process. 
Institutions support the integration, but they are not a precondition for it. With the 
exception of the Single European Act, Moravcsik does not see the European Commission 
as the leading power in the integration. Institutions generally do not have political 
autonomy and depend on the changes in national preferences (Steinhilber, 2005, p. 170). 
According to Moravcsik, institutions are useful and acceptable to governments if they 
strengthen "their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise 
unachievable" (1993, p. 507). There are two ways for making this. First, institutions may 
make the result from interstate bargaining more efficient (e.g. being a forum for 
negotiation, applying the decision-making procedures etc). Moravcsik explains this 
through the expression "pooling and delegating sovereignty". Second, they strengthen the 
autonomy of national leaders in comparison with the domestic social groups. They do this 
by increasing the "legitimacy and credibility of common institutions of common policies 
and … the domestic agenda-setting power" (ibid., p. 507). 
With the help of functional regime theory he explains the role of the institutions, which 
provide an environment for negotiations and decrease transaction costs – "the costs of 
identifying issues, negotiating bargains, codifying agreements, and monitoring and 
enforcing compliance" (ibid., p. 508). The author defines two ways in which governments 
may transfer national sovereignty: by pooling national sovereignty through qualified 
majority voting rules (the governments decide to take decisions not through unanimity, 
but through other voting procedures) and by delegating sovereign powers to central 
institutions which are not fully independent, but are able take a decision "without an 
intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto" (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 67). The qualified 
majority voting increases the mutual dependency of governments in decision-making 
processes and makes them more dependent on the agenda setting of the Commission 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p. 509). Moravcsik tries to understand why governments choose 
pooling and delegating instead of unanimity voting for each case. One of the main reasons 
which he underlines is that states make a cost-benefit analysis of the expected institutional 
 16 
decisions. Delegating and pooling can lead to linkage and may be more time and cost 
efficient in comparison with the case-to-case package deals. Once transferring national 
sovereignty, states have control over the common decision-making procedure. On the 
other hand, he compares risk and efficiency in both procedures: 
"…delegation involves greater political risk and more efficient decision-
making, while pooling through qualified majority voting involves less risk, 
but correspondingly less efficiency" (ibid., p. 510) 
 
The European Community needs an external representation when it negotiates with 
third parties (e.g. customs). In order to trust these institutions, the governments need to 
perceive them as neutral, at the same time they monitor them closely. Such institutions 
can act independently when there is time pressure and national governments cannot take a 
decision (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 512). He explains later that the European Court of Justice 
has expanded its enforcement power to become an independent supranational body.   
Moravcsik explains that giving the agenda setting function to the Commission as a 
supranational organisation was due to the wide consensus on a "broad substantive agenda" 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p.511). In this way, the number of proposals is decreased and the 
procedure is less time-consuming. As the Commission prepares the proposals, small 
countries are not likely to be disadvantaged. Neutral enforcement (from a supranational 
legal system) becomes the function of enforcement and "strengthens the credibility of 
national commitments to the institution". 
Moravcsik tries to understand why institutions arise. At the beginning of "The Choice for 
Europe" he explains three theories which may explain delegation and pooling of national 
sovereignty: federalism / nationalism, technocratic management and credible commitment 
(Moravcsik, 1999, p. 69). Using a case study he gives arguments for the plausibility of the 
third theory. Pooling and delegation activities have an important role here. Governments 
are inclined to accept this as a way to make sure "that other governments will accept 
agreed legislation and enforcement" (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 74). In this way, they show their 
own credibility and assure that they will be involved in future decisions despite domestic 
opposition. Pooling and delegating can be used by the governments to make commitments 
to decisions which have unclear costs and benefits and therefore do not have a strong 
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opposition. Following certain rules, procedures and norms, governments still bargain. 
Under these institutional circumstances a particular level of agreement is ensured (ibid.). 
The author also explains how institutions increase the credibility of international 
commitments. Institutions are a mechanism in the international field where no state has a 
monopoly. After governments have pooled or delegated sovereignty, it is very difficult to 
"re-establish unilateral control" – this may lead to complicated negotiations with unclear 
results. On the other hand, institutions often also have ideological support, and attempts 
from governments to act unilateral may arise suspicions and damage their reputation. 
Pooling and delegation to institutions happens when the details about future policies are 
unknown. Governments' support for this varies across issue and country (Moravcsik, 
1999, p. 75). If the status quo is unattractive and the expected gains are bigger, states are 
likely to pool or delegate sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 510). Governments are not 
willing to take political risk ("probability of a large downside loss to a government or 
interest groups", ibid., p. 511). Therefore, they do this to a minimal extent in the cases of 
external representation, agenda-setting and enforcement. 
Although Moravcsik recognizes that the theory for the credible commitments explains 
very good delegation and pooling well, he does not “exclude ideological considerations 
entirely" (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 488). For example: 
"The Anglo-French tradition of general opposition to increased supranational 
delegation and pooling, as well as the German support for them, appears to reflect 
public and parliamentary ideology" (ibid.). 
Schimmelfennig accuses Moravcsik of "biased case selection" in “The Choice for Europe” 
(in Wiener / Diez, 2004, p.80).  
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2 Theories on migration 
2.1 Economic theories 
 
Neoclassical theory 
The neoclassical theory has a big influence in migration studies, but at the same time, 
alternative approaches challenge it (Castles and Miller, 2009, p. 21). It is based on the 
"push-pull" theory. “Push factors” are the reasons that make people emigrate from their 
home country. This may include demographic growth, low living standards, lack of 
economic opportunities, political repressions etc. “Pull factors” are those which attract the 
immigrants to a certain country e.g. demand for labor, availability of land, political 
freedoms, good economic opportunities etc (ibid.). The neoclassical theory sees the 
individual as a rational entity whose decisions are based on a calculation of the costs and 
benefits of moving to another country or stay at the home country. It assumes that the 
individual have full information about employment and wages in the receiving country. 
The main point is "human capital" and the decision to invest in migration is similar to the 
decision to invest in education or some training. People will immigrate if they are 
expecting to earn more money. Borjas explains that migration flows are result of 
individual search for the best country (in Castles and Miller, 2009, p. 22). According to 
him, this would lead to economic equilibrium between developed and underdeveloped 
countries. Moreover, this may have negative effects of the receiving countries such as 
decline of average skill levels and lower wages for local low-skilled workers. According 
to Chiswick, highly skilled people are most expected to move to another country, which 
often causes a brain drain from the sending country (ibid.). 
Massey sees the neoclassical economics at macro and a micro level. According to the 
macro theory, people move from low-wage countries to high-wage countries. It foresees 
that due to the emigration the supply of labor in the sending country decreases and wages 
rise. The result from migration to the high-wage countries is that due to the increase in the 
labor supply, wages fall and finally there is equilibrium in the wages at international level. 
Some of the assumptions are that: 
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- International migration is propelled by the difference in the wages and once 
there is equilibrium international migration will stop 
- Governments can easily control migration flows through regulating the labor 
market 
At the micro level, individuals are rational actors who decide to migrate after calculating 
costs and benefits. Before receiving a good wage they must first make some investments 
such as learning a new language and culture, adapting to new labor market as well as 
creating new ties (Massey, 1993, p. 434; see also Massey, 1994). Expectations are also 
important: the higher the expected returns, the bigger the international migrant flow. Here 
are some of the theory’s main assumptions: 
- Migration flows are a sum of individual moves which were made after a cost-
benefit calculation 
- International movements are caused by differences in the employment rates and 
/ or earnings in the sending and receiving states and it continues until expectations 
are equalized; the more the expected return, the bigger the migration flows 
- Labor markets have the biggest influence on decisions to migrate 
- Individual characteristics increase the likelihood of international movement 
(human capital: education, experience etc.) 
- Governments can influence immigration through policies concerning expected 
earning in sending or receiving country: e.g. employers’ sanctions, long-term 
development programmes etc. 
Castles criticizes neoclassical theory after giving examples on migration. In most of the 
cases people who migrated were coming from the middle class and they were not the 
poorest ones. The push-pull theory assumes that people move from densely populated 
areas to sparsely populated areas, but it cannot explain why there are migration flows to 
Germany or the Netherlands that are densely populated (Castles / Miller, 2009, p.23). 
Another weakness is that it cannot give an explanation why a certain group moves to a 
certain country e.g. Turks to Germany or Algerians to France. Moreover, migrants do not 
have full information and are subject to many constraints (e.g. employers, governments 
etc.). 
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New economics of labor migration 
New economics of labor migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985 in Castles and Miller, p. 24), 
which developed in the 1980s, takes the social groups as a unit of analysis. Here, 
migration decisions are taken by the family, the household or the community (ibid.). 
Acting in this way, they expect to maximize expected income and to decrease risks (Stark 
in Massey, 1993, p. 436). Households can control risks better than individuals as they can 
diversify the household resources (e.g. through family labor). Some family members may 
be working in local economy, others may be sent abroad to earn money and another 
possibility for sustaining the household is through remittances. Families can minimize risk 
through sending a family member abroad. In comparison to those in developing countries, 
the income of households in developed countries is secured through government 
programmes and the credit market can finance new projects (ibid.). The lack of insurance 
programmes in case of unemployment or disability can also lead to migration of a family 
member as well as the need of investment capital (Massey, p.437). Massey gives example 
with cultivating crops. Introducing new technologies and new arts of crops brings risks 
and if it is not successful, the family could have insufficient food or income. Some of the 
theory’s main assumptions are: 
- Families, households or culturally defined units are units of analysis 
- Wage differences are not always the only reasons for migration, migration can 
be a way to avoid risks 
- International migration does not stop necessarily when there are no more wage 
differences, but may continue because of other reasons such as absence of other 
markets in the sending countries 
- Governments can influence migration through labor market policies as well as 
through policies on investment, capital markets and income distribution (Massey, 
1993, p.440) 
Although poverty is seen as one of the main push factors, Körner explains that it is not the 
only one and it is also important whether the unemployed persons have money to sponsor 
their migration. He shows this in his study about the Maghreb countries (in Nuscheler, 
2004, p.106).  
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Dual labor market theory 
Nuscheler also looks at push and pull factors in migration flows. Piore (in Nuscheler, 
2004, p. 105; see also Castles and Miller, 2009, p.23) develops the theory about the dual 
labor market and the reasons for migrant jobs opportunities in the industrial states. 
According to him, immigration is caused by pull factors in the receiving country: the 
demand about immigrant labor characterized by the advanced industrial societies and their 
economies (Massey, 1993, p. 441). Local people avoid bad paid and insecure jobs, which 
creates demand in these sectors. In contrast to industrial mass production, in the 1990s 
more workers were needed in small enterprises in the service sector. The development of 
the world economic system creates very poor regions and causes people to flee from 
poverty who are attracted by the newly economically developed centres (Fischer, 2006, p. 
23). They are unskilled and very flexible. At the same time, there are job opportunities for 
highly skilled foreign workers, because the domestic education system has not prepared 
enough workers (Nuscheler, 2004, p. 105; also Castles and Miller, 2009, p.23). In many 
cases immigrant labor is a good solution for employers’ needs (in Massey, 1993): 
- Structural inflation: Wages are usually connected to social status and hierarchy. 
Therefore, if employers try to attract native workers for “unskilled jobs at the 
bottom of the occupational hierarchy” through wage increase, this would mean that 
those one who are higher in the occupational hierarchy would also demand an 
increase in their wages. An easier and cheaper solution is to hire migrant workers 
who accept lower wages. 
- Motivational problems: Work brings not only income, but also social status. 
There is always a bottom of the hierarchy and therefore motivational problems 
exist. For many immigrants employment is seen as a way of earning money and is 
not connected to social prestige and status (at least at the beginning of their 
migration careers). Some reasons for this may be that they want to use the money 
at home (for building a house, shop, starting a business) or they have a high status 
in their home community because of their income abroad that is higher than the 
standards in the sending country. 
- Economic dualism: the labor market is segmented and native workers are 
attracted by the primary sector, which is secure and where wages are high, 
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therefore employers search for migrants who can occupy the positions with low 
wages and unstable positions (Kratzmann, 2007, p.52) 
- The demography of labor supply: The first three factors create a permanent 
demand on workers who are willing to work “under unpleasant conditions, at low 
wages, with great instability and facing little chance for advancement” (Massey, 
1993, p.443). In the past this gap was filled by women who were not the main 
breadwinner and teenagers trying to earn extra money (ibid.). Nowadays, women 
pursue a career for social status and the number of teenagers entering the labor 
force is smaller because of the lower birth rates and the formal education. Migrants 
respond to this demand. 
Native workers avoid low paid and unskilled jobs which creates opportunities for migrant 
workers. This theory assumes that: 
- International labor migration is initiated by recruiting employers and 
governments based on labor demand 
- Employers have incentives to hire workers and keep the wages constant 
- Social and institutional mechanisms can keep low-level wages from increasing, 
but cannot keep them from falling 
- Governments are unlikely to change migration flows through changes in the 
wages or the employment rates because the demand on immigrant workers is based 
in the economic organization of modern economies (Massey, 1993, p. 444) 
The world system theory is based on the dual labor market theory. According to 
Kratzmann, undocumented migrants are an important part of the labor market and provide 
cheap labor for the Western economies (2007, p.52). 
Both dual labor market theory and new economics of labor migration accept the existence 
of push factors, but the former emphasises the individual decision to migrate, whereas the 
latter sees the propeller in the family. Dual labor market theory emphasizes the strong 
employers’ demand on unskilled workers, which can undermine the policies on border 
control. And still Castles and Miller argue that the economic approach can explain only 
some aspects of the migration issues. 
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2.2 Social and family theories 
Migration networks 
Another important theory is the one about migration networks. Family members who are 
already in the receiving country can provide a big support for new coming immigrants 
(material and psychological one). Migration networks are very important for third state 
nationals and irregular migrants because of the cultural differences and sometimes hostile 
environment (Hugo in Nuscheler, 2004, p.107; see also Fischer, 2006, p. 24 and Massey, 
1993, p. 448). Family networks are part of the push-pull theory (Lee, 1972 in Fischer, 
2006, p. 24). The rates of unemployment as well as the wage level are important for the 
decision to immigrate. 
The first migrants’ immigration is an expensive endeavour, as they do not have social 
contacts in the receiving country. Entering the country without documents makes this 
even more difficult. Settled migrants reduce the costs for their relatives or friends who 
want to migrate. Böcker calls them “bridgeheads” (1994 cited in de Haas, 2008, p.19). 
New migrants reduce costs for the next ones coming after them. Migration networks 
diffuse and at some point anyone who wants can migrate. An implication of this is that 
migration becomes less selective – “with regards to access of migrants to human and 
material capital” (Taylor 1986 in de Haas, 2008, p.20). Then migration flows decrease 
(Massey, 1993, p.450). The size of migration is not so much connected to wage 
differences and employment rates but to the decreasing costs and risks though the 
network. Governments have difficulties in trying to manage these migration flows because 
the reasons for this process are out the governments’ control. De Haas describes also 
network migration as “chain migration” – it is characterized by the interpersonal ties 
connecting migrants and non-migrants (2008, p.19). 
De Haas criticizes the theory because it focuses on cases where network is really 
important. In the long term, this type of migration may decrease or stop when its causes 
disappear. And although governments can hardly control network effects, they can still 
have “influence on the magnitude and nature of migration, although not necessarily in the 
intended direction“ (ibid. p.20). Another factor are the internal forces. Friend and kin 
relationships may weaken with the time and have a restrictive role to immigration.  
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Migration systems theory 
A migration system consists of two or more countries which exchange migrants with each 
other. Distant countries may be also part of one system, e.g. North / West Africa and 
France (Castles and Miller, 2003, p. 27). This migration theory examines both ends of the 
migration flow (sending and receiving countries) and the linkages between them. It 
assumes that there are prior links in sending and receiving states (political, cultural, trade 
or historical ones). In this way, it gives an explanation why exactly Algerians migrate to 
France and Turks to Germany. 
According to this theory, migration is a result of the interaction between micro- and 
macro-structures. Macro-structures include institutional factors such as interstate 
relationships, laws, structures and practices in the receiving and sending countries 
concerning migration control (ibid., p.28). Informal migrants’ social networks are part of 
the micro-structures. This might be connected to family, employers or the community. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p.119 in Castles and Miller, 2003, p.28) call this social 
capital. It includes also friendship ties and mutual help in economic and social matters. In 
many regions decisions for the migration of family members is taken by the elderly 
members of the family. The meso-structure lies between the macro and micro- structures. 
It consists of institutions which can help or exploit migrants e.g. recruitment agencies, 
smugglers, lawyers, agents etc. (Harris, 1996, p. 132-136 in Castles and Miller, p. 29). 
Institutional theory 
Capital-rich countries have a certain numbers for visa issuance. With the increase of 
migrants’ number, the number of visas becomes insufficient. This creates opportunity for 
entrepreneurs who support international movement for profit. This creates a black market 
for migration. Exploitation and victimization are often the case in such underground 
markets, therefore voluntary humanitarian organizations arise in order to protect rights of 
the undocumented migrants. Profit organizations and entrepreneurs provide services like 
smuggling, arranging marriages, counterfeiting documents and visas in exchange for 
money. On the other hand, humanitarian organizations provide counselling, legal help and 
social services. When organizations become well-known and institutionally stable they 
can help migrants to gain access to foreign labor markets (Massey, 1993, p.451). The two 
hypotheses of the theory descend from the micro level: 
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“1. As organizations develop to support, sustain and promote international 
movement, the international migrant flow becomes more and more 
institutionalized and independent of the factors which originally caused it. 
2. Governments have difficulties controlling migration flows once they have 
begun because the process of institutionalization is difficult to regulate. 
Given the profits to be made by meeting the demand for immigrant entry, 
police efforts only serve to create a black market in international movements, 
and stricter immigration policies are met with resistance from humanitarian 
groups.” (ibid.) 
2.3 Other reasons for migration 
Although this work is not focusing on asylum-seekers, it is worth noting that often reasons 
for immigration are not just economical, but also political ones. These might be wars or 
repressions against ethnic or religious minorities (e.g. Kurds, Tibetians etc.). Another case 
is a dictatorship that oppresses opposition. To give some example, Saddam Houssein tried 
to solve the „Kurds problem“ through genocide and the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina created a big movement to Western countries. Another reason can be also a 
natural disaster (see Nuscheler, 2004, p. 110 and Fischer, 2006, p. 20). 
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3 Migration policy in Europe 
3.1 Common migration policy 
The EU Common Migration Policy comprises external border control, policy toward 
refugees, immigrants and third country nationals (TCN). Ideas for free movement arise in 
the Rome Treaties (1957). According to Tomei, the common migration policy starts with 
the project for the Single Market (1997, p. 15), which foresees free movement of 
commodities, services, capital and people. Though it came into force in 1992, regulation 
of free movement of people was still in the sovereignty of the member states. An example 
for this is the Schengen Intergovernmental Treaty (1985), which regulated those 
movements and was not a part of the acquis communitaire. By signing this treaty the 
states relieved the movement of people inside the Schengen area and, at the same time, 
external border controls were strengthened. Some of its main points are: 
- all signatory states must request visas for nationals of countries which most often 
send refugees 
- air companies may be sanctioned if they accept passengers without proper visa 
documents 
- decision for the creation of an information system and exchange of data 
- asylum-seekers can apply for a refugee status only in one signatory state in the 
Schengen area, and if the application is rejected, this would apply for all the 
countries in the Schengen area (in Nuscheler, 2004, 178) 
The second Schengen Treaty was signed in 1990. It complemented the first one and 
outlined long-term objectives on visa and refugee issues. Still this treaty is applied only 
when it complies with the acquis. 
Important international groups working on the issue of movement of people in the 
beginning of the 1990s are, for example, the Trevi Commission and the ad hoc 
Immigration group dealing with refugees, external borders and visas (Tomei, 1997, 21). 
Another international treaty is the Dublin Convention (1990). It aims at: 
- avoiding refugee tourism (looking for the state with the best conditions for 
applying) and working on the same application in different countries 
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- guaranteeing that each application for a refugee status will be considered 
(Nuscheler, 2004, 178) 
The last examples point out the importance of the state decisions and the interstate 
treaties, which Moravcsik also claims in his intergovernmental theory (“The Choice for 
Europe”). According to him, other important aspects are the interests and influence of 
social groups in the state (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481). They may define a certain policy as a 
national one which is presented and defended at international negotiations (Steinhilber, 
2005, 169).  
3.1.1 International or supranational? 
In the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the communist regime collapsed 
and an increase in the immigration flows to Western Europe was observed (Tomei, 1997, 
24). This made the states think about measures for burden sharing. The solution of this 
question was mostly seen at the European level, rather than at national one (ibid., p. 59). 
And still states are the propellers for changes in these issues.  An example for this is the 
summit in Fontainbleau (1984), when France and Germany proposed to reduce border 
controls. Seven years later at a summit in Luxembourg Germany made a proposal for 
harmonization of the European policies on refugees, immigration and third states nationals 
through a treaty (Tomei, 1997, 25). The differing points of view found a compromise in 
the Maastricht Treaty and the separation of the migration issues in the first and third 
pillar. Visa policy is part of the first pillar where the decision-making process is on a 
supranational level. Decisions on refugees, (irregular) immigration and third country 
nationals from the third pillar are taken through unanimity of the Council. This means that 
member states still keep their right to regulate these areas through national acts e.g. for 
entering, stay and settlement (Nuscheler, 2004, 179). 
An important step 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam some issues moved from the third pillar to the first one, 
but on the insistance of Germany decisions on refugees still need unanimity (Nuscheler, 
2004, 180; see also Caviedes, 2004, p.6). Title IV “Visas, refugees, immigration and other 
issues connected to free movement of people” envisaged for the Council to adopt 
unanimous measures on exernal border controls, permissions for refugees and immigrants 
in the next five years. This means that the member states could use a veto and 
developments in a certain policy depends on the political will of each state. The European 
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Parliament has just a consultative role. Although the European Commision and the 
Parliament insist on harmonization in this issues, they do not have such a big influence 
(Nuscheler). After a certain period of time the co-decision procedure was introduced for 
the adoption of directives and regulations on immigration policy. The Schengen acquis 
was incorporated in the legal framework of the European Union through the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Still the United Kingdom and Ireland opted out because they wanted to keep their 
sovereignty over the national borders1. Nevertheless, they participated in some aspects of 
the Schengen Treaty such as the Schengen Information System which comprises an 
international computarized database and greater information sharing from consular and 
police agents. Denmark participated in the Schengen Treaty with a possibility to opt out of 
the Amsterdam Treaty Title IV2. Still the Schengen acquis belongs to the third pillar of the 
Euopean Union (with the exception of the visum policy which is in the first pillar) and 
thus further decisions depend on the will of the states. 
The Tampere programme (1999-2004) aims at fulfilling the political goals of the 
Amsterdam Treaty through concrete actions. It was announced at the European Council in 
Tampere 1999 and it aims at the creation of the EU’s new ‘union of freedom, security and 
justice’, which requires a common asylum and immigration policy (Caviedes, 2004, p.7; 
see also Geddes, 2003, p.138). It aims at development of common migration policy within 
some key areas: 
- Partnership with countries of origin with respect to political, human rights and 
development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit;  
- A common European asylum system based on the Geneva Convention;  
- Fair treatment of third country nationals aimed at granting them rights and obligations 
comparable to those of EU citizens; 
- More efficient management of migration flows based on closer co-operation between 
Member States and with countries of origin and transit3.  
The Commission answered with its Communique from 2000 (757, final), pointing out that 
measures for legal migration are essential, taking into account migrantion for 
humanitarian and economic reasons or family reunion. 
                                                 
1 Gelatt, Julia (2005) – “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe”, 
2 Geddes, 2003, Immigration and Integration in Europe, p. 137 
3 COM (2001) 387 final, p.5 
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Open method for coordination 
A new approach was formalized at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. Its 
purpose was to engage diverse policies (e.g. education and social exclusion) and to spread 
the “best practices”. Caviedes points out the following steps as important: 
“- allowing the EU to set common guidelines along with specific timetables;  
- establishing a system of common quantitative and qualitative indicators that 
allows the member states to compare and benchmark their practices and  
policy performance; 
- allowing the member states to translate these guidelines into national and regional 
policies that set specific targets and implementation procedures, yet allow for 
diversity and flexibility in each individual case;  
- periodic monitoring and evaluation through a peer review process whose  
primary goal is educative” (Cavides, 2004, p.8) 
At European level important actors are the Commission, the Council, committees and 
European level social actors. The Commission has the right to initiate policies. The 
European Council coordinates this with the respective committees. After that guidelines 
are adopted and have to be translated into National Actions Plans.  At the national level, 
governments are expected to involve NGOs, social actors and social society 
representatives. Open method on coordination is aiming at transparency and democratic 
participation. Still it is criticized that it is a “soft law” mechanism, goals might not be 
realistic and their implementation might be even more difficult (ibid). 
In 2001 the Commission adopted a Communique involving the open coordination method 
in the common immigration policy. The Commission will coordinate national policies, 
and the best practices should be exchanged. On the Commission’s proposal the Council is 
to adopt future direction for development of the EU. This is to be part of National Action 
Plans as regional and national differences have to be taken in consideration. The 
Commission proposed six guidelines (COM 2001 387 final): 
- to develop a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to migration management at 
national level 
- to improve information available on legal possibilities for admission to the EU and on 
the consequences of using illegal channels, the Commission proposed awareness 
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campaigns in third countries on smuggling an trafficking, as well as  information services 
in third countries about legal ways of entry 
- to reinforce the fight against illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking by 
supporting measures such as sanctions against criminal activities and enhancing controls 
at external borders. 
- to establish a coherent and transparent policy and procedures for opening the labor 
market to third country nationals within the framework of the European employment 
strategy. National legislations should offer clear procedures on the selection of labor 
migrants form third countries.  
- to integrate migration issues into relations with third countries, and in particular with 
countries of origin. This aims at encouraging migrants to keep in touch with their 
countries of origin and to discourage future immigration 
- to ensure the development of integration policies for third country nationals residing 
legally on the territories of the Member States 
Due to the increase of irregular immigration in the EU  and after September 11, 2001 and 
the Council’s decisions from 2002 focused mainly on conclusions for measures against 
irregular immigration, influencing the migration flow and defence of the common borders 
(Janh / Maurer / Oetzmann, 2006, p. 8). 
In 2001 the Commission issued a Working Paper pointing out that the “fight against 
illegal immgration” is a main priority. Among its main policy areas are: judicial 
cooperation, cooperation between police and intelligence services, sanctios on financing 
of terrorism, measures at the border and other measures4. 
The European Commission issued a “Communication on the development of a common 
policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, external 
borders and the return of illegal residents” in 2002. It follows the direction of the Sevilla 
Council aiming at combating illegal immigration5. The Commission focused on external 
border controls, partnership with third countries and return policy. After that it 
recommended the creation of FRONTEX, which would control the external borders of the 
EU (cited in Valchev, 2010, p. 102)6. At the time of the Tampere Action Plan, the focus of 
                                                 
4Asylum : Commission paper seeks balance between improving security and protecting refugees rights, 
IP/01/1754, Brussels, 6 December 2001 
5  COM (2003) 323 
6 ibid. 
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the common immigration policy was security and combat against illegal immigration. The 
Qualified Majority Voting was already used for making decisions during the Hague 
Action Plan that made this process easier. 
After the Treaty of Nizza the member states could use the co-decision procedure for 
decisions on migration issues. In this way, some responsibilities are transfered to the 
European level and decisions do not depend to such an extent on the political will of the 
states (Council), but to a big extent on the Parliament (Janh / Maurer / Oetzmann, 2006, 
9). 
The Hague programme had five main areas for the development of the immigration 
policy: 
- A common European asylum system 
- Legal migration and the fight against illegal employment 
- Integration of third-country nationals 
- The external dimension of asylum and migration policy 
- The management of migration flows7 
 
The Hague programme came after the Tampere programme and was in power until 
2004. The Stockholm Action plan envisages measures until 2014. Some of them are 
connected to admission policy, control of illegal immigration and creation of a single 
asylum procedure (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 53; see also Caviedes, 2004, p.7). Joanne 
van Selm points out that the Hague programme relied on existing agreements and did not 
have a clear plan for a future asylum system. Although there was rhetoric on building 
common immigration policy, legal immigration and immigrants integration is in the 
powers of the member states8. Boswell and Geddes pay attention to the fact that the action 
plans state objectives, which does not mean that they are achieved. For example, 
Directives state legal objectives, but they do not specify the means for reaching them. This 
creates space for national variations (Boswell / Geddes, 2011). 
The next step in transferring sovereignty in the area of migration issues was the Dublin II 
Regulation, which was not an international treaty, but a part of the acquis. It replaced the 
Dublin Convention and its main goal was to identify which member state was responsible 
                                                 
7 van Selm, Joanne ”The Hague Program Reflects New European Realities”, Migration Policy Institute, New 
York, 2005 
8 ibid. 
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for making a decision on refugee applications. The Dublin II Regulation set criteria 
according to which the state responsible for decision-making on application is defined e.g. 
if there are relatives who are residents there, if the entry was illegal or if there was a stay 
in another member state9. A second aim of the regulation is to prevent applying for 
refugee status in more than one country.  
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was adopted in 2008 under the French 
presidency and can be seen as an early version of the Stockholm programme. And yet it is 
a political declaration without juridical powers. There are five main areas: 
- organizing legal migration according to the needs of the member states; integration 
of the migrants 
- fight against illegal migration and return issues 
- building Europe of asylum 
- more efficiency on border control 
- global partnership with sending and transit countries10 
The Pact appeals that each country define its current market needs and set a quota for 
regular migrants and family reunion members. Measures of integration should aim at easy 
learning of the host country language and access to work. 
The Lisbon Treaty deepened integration. An important aspect is the solidarity principle, 
which means fair sharing of responsibility on refugee and immigration issues. The 
European Parliament got more competencies through the use of the co-decision procedure 
with the European Council in the area of the legal migration. At the same time, the 
European Council could adopt measures on immigration and asylum with qualified 
majority voting (QMV). It is still responsible for political planning and development of 
strategies. The Court of Justice can annul legislation and can "rule on failure to act on part 
of EU institutions and in cases of infringement where member states have failed to fulfil 
their obligations" (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 10).  
The European Commission got new competencies, but at the same time it cannot act on its 
own and it is still dependent on the member states. Although the European Commission is 
responsible for the implementation of the legislation, it employs 23.000 people and does 
                                                 
9 Dublin II Regulation – Summaries of EU legislation  
10 Carrera, Sergio and Elspeth Guild “The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: 
Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanisation? Security vs. Rights?” CEPS Working Document No. 170, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008, p. 2 
 34 
not have the resources to monitor the implementation of the legislation in all the member 
states (ibid., p. 56).  
Another important role on immigration and asylum topics is that of Justice and Home 
Affairs Council (JHA). It is composed of the justice and interior ministers of the member 
states, who meet almost every two months. They are supported by the Council's 
Secretariat and by member states’ permanent representatives (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 
56). 
The Lisbon Treaty set out provisions on border, asylum and migration (Article 77-80) and 
incorporated them into the Treaty framework (Box 1.2, Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 10).  
The quick overview on the migration policy development shows that in the beginning the 
process was regulated by the states and gradually some (but not all) competencies were 
transferred to the EU. 
According to Moravcsik (see the first chapter), transferring sovereignty to the European 
institutions can make decisions less time-consuming and a particular level of agreement is 
secured. At the same time, a common migration policy can provide ideological support for 
certain actions, otherwise unilateral actions could damage the reputation of the 
governments. Another reason for delegating rights to international institutions is that in 
this way, there is less risk when details about the future are unknown.  
3.1.2 Top-down Europeanization 
Pre-existing conditions connected to migration and asylum policy shape government 
preferences and have a bottom-up influence to Europeanization. At the same time, top-
down Europeanization also exists (Menz, 2010, p.81). Menz points out two modes of top-
down Europeanization. The first one is the national implementation of the EU regulations 
which may modify them and change their original impetus (p.83). The second one is the 
bottom-up Europeanization, which can influence the formation of the EU regulations 
according to the national preferences. However, asylum and immigration policy in the 
EU-12 member states is part of the acquis and product of top-down Europeanization. in 
Central and Eastern Europe the labor market interest, associations have stronger influence 
in comparison to humanitarian NGOs, which are very weak (ibid., p.86). 
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3.1.3 Lobbying 
Menz points out two main factors which define the influence of the nongovernmental 
actors: the "institutional framework of the state-society nexus" and the "internal 
organizational characteristics". The first one relates to the way in which governmental 
and nongovernmental actors communicate. Nongovernmental organizations may be 
autonomous or self-governing. They may be consulted by government actors or may work 
together in the distribution of services to new immigrants. At the same time, governments 
do not want to share the control over migration management as they may tolerate 
lobbying, but no co-management (Menz, 2010, p.88). The internal characteristics of the 
organizations depend on the degree of centralization (large number of representatives for 
one camp – low centralization), internal cohesion (control over the sectoral members, 
participation of members in the decision-making process) and the representation among 
clientele ("measured in terms of the percentage of total potential constituents that are 
members of the interest associations", ibid., p.89). German unions and employers are 
characterized as having "medium" influence as well as those in Italy. According to Menz, 
labor market interest associations are much more influential in shaping migration policy 
than humanitarian NGOs. The first ones are more professional and institutionalized and 
the second ones are more based on scholarly work of interest groups and less powerful 
organizational characteristics. 
3.1.4 Decision-making 
Asylum and migration policy used to be a national domain and steps toward 
Europeanization are very slow sometimes including resistance. Until 2004 the 
Commission and the member states had the right to jointly propose directives. According 
to Menz, most of the proposals were coming from the Commission and the states initiated 
joint deportation measures. The Council decided to exchange the procedure of unanimous 
decision-making with qualified majority voting (Menz, 2010, p.99). The Commission 
proposals often encountered the resistance of the Council of Ministers. Countries with 
established migration regimes like Germany were not willing to accept immediately top-
down Europeanization of this issue. For new member states and the Mediterranean 
countries that had relatively few regulations on migration EU regulations had a significant 
influence on the national legislation. 
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4 Irregular migrants 
4.1 Migration, mobility and population 
Boswell and Geddes make a difference between mobility and migration. The first one 
happens when citizens of the European Union exercise their right for free movement. The 
second term refers to movements from outside the EU by third country nationals (TCNs). 
The free movement of workers has been supported with the development of the single 
market, but the extra-EU migration by TCNs is a new topic for the policy-makers. It was 
introduced with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), and with the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) it 
was incorporated in EU's legal and political framework (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 2).  
 
Population 
Immigrants are seen as an important resource for growth considering the ageing 
population of Europe. In 2008 there were 4 persons in working age for each person over 
65 years (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 5). The expectations by 2060 are that the ratio will 
be 2:1. As migrants are also getting old, this process is supposed to be sustained so that 
new migrants come. This is a very hot topic for European politicians. Other solutions to 
the problems arising from the demographic changes could be the increase in the 
retirement age or in the female participation in the labor market (ibid.).  
4.2 Irregular immigration 
In the beginning of the new century there were lots of incidents with boats trying to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea and reach EU Member states. FRONTEX reported that the number 
of the attempts for irregular crossing of the land or sea border of the EU increased 
between 2007 and 2008. In March 2009 a boat with 200 people on board crashed near the 
Libyan shore11. And in April 2009 people coming from Africa were saved after their 
inflatable boats sunk near the Turkish shore. These examples show an aspect of the 
irregular immigration question (Geddes, 2011, p. 122). But these are not the only ways in 
which irregular immigration can happen (Portes / DeWind, 2007, p. 288) 
                                                 
11 Bad weather caused Lybian migrant boat to sink; http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/01/us-libya-
migrants-idUSTRE5302EA20090401 
 38 
The EU has played an important role in ensuring "that new member states accord with EU 
border control requirements" and in exporting "EU border control and security practices to 
non-EU member states" (Geddes, 2011, p.123). 
But irregular immigration is also closely related to the admission policies of the states and 
their changes. New immigration countries such as Spain and Italy introduced visa 
requirements in 1991 in accordance with the Schengen requirements. Shortly after that 
there was an increase in the smuggling activities across their land and sea borders 
(Geddes, 2011, p. 123). 
Geddes criticises some countries that “talk tough” about border controls, but they do little 
to prevent the irregular entry in fact (Geddes, 2011, p. 123). 
4.2.1 Push-pull factors 
In most of the cases irregular migration is described as a threat to the society for the 
receiving countries. Migrants are pulled by the image of wealth in these countries and at 
the same time conflict, environmental changes and poor development pushes them to the 
EU states (Geddes, 2011, p. 127).  
4.2.2 Labor market 
Düvell and Jordan pay attention to the connection of irregular migration with the 
economics of the host country. They claim that irregular migration is closely connected to 
globalisation.  
In the 1990s the number of asylum-seeker (mostly black and Asian migrants) rose and in 
many countries this was accepted as disguised irregular migration. Illegality was seen as a 
threat to the standards of living and cultures of the citizens of the First World (Düvell / 
Jordan 2002, p. 15). The political debate in Europe was, on the one hand, concerning 
handling ethnic diversity and, on the other hand, it was focusing on the possible 
advantages of recruitment for the EU labor market from outside. 
From the perspective of the shadow economics, irregular migrants are flexible, mobile and 
willing to accept low wages and hence an important resource. Despite the large number of 
irregular migrants, the EU governments try to manage the migration flow and to allow 
skilled workers to enter and settle (Düvell / Jordan 2002, p. 16). 
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4.3 Definition of irregular migrants 
According to Geddes, irregular migration is first defined through regular migration and 
what it is. Some sectors (as construction and agriculture) need cheap labor, this may be 
provided by migrant workers. This explains also why irregular migrants find jobs in 
certain sectors (Geddes, 2011, p. 127).  
Düvell and Jordan (2002, p. 15) define irregular migrants as unauthorized entry to another 
country. According to Riedel (2011, p.12) the difference between “illegal” and “irregular” 
migration is that “illegal” refers to breach of the (inter)national norms and laws and 
“irregular” refers more to the violation of the immigration laws.  
4.3.1 Definition of the EU 
The EU has a more detailed definition in its EU Return Directive (2008, article 25): 
“‘illegal stay means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-
country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set 
out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or 
residence in that Member State”12 
Article 5 of the Schengen Border Code13 states the necessary d conditions for legal entry 
of a person: 
- possession of a valid travel document 
- possession of a valid visa if required 
- justification of the purpose to stay and means of subsistence and for stay, 
return and onward travel 
- no alert in the Schengen Information System 
- no threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the 
international relations of any member state 
 
According to Geddes and Boswell (2011, p. 128), some terms may refer to wrong 
impressions about the character of irregular immigration. For example, "clandestine" 
immigration has the hint of people smuggled through sea or land borders. This might not 
                                                 
12 Article 3, Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Praliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (EU 
Return Directive) 
13 Article 5, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Praliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code) 
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be the case, in fact – more often people enter the country with a tourist visa and they stay 
after it expires. Another misleading term might be "undocumented" migration. Their entry 
might have been authorised at some point, but their further stay, residence or employment 
is not allowed. According to them, the term "illegal" migration is most neutral and does 
not refer to criminal acts, smuggling and the absence of documents. 
Irregular migration is not just connected to irregular crossing of border. It might be 
connected to irregularity of residence and employment status, as well as to the type of 
employment (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 125). Geddes / Boswell talk about thirteen 
different forms of irregular migration which are made after combining the four 
characteristics (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 130). In this work the term “irregular” will be 
used. 
Heckmann points out that irregular migration is mostly associated with an unauthorised 
way of crossing the border. He gives an example of Moldavians trying to secretly cross 
the German-Czech border. And Romanians, who do not need a visa to enter, travelling by 
bus, but nevertheless intending to work in the shadow economy (in Portes / DeWind, 
2007, p.286). He describes three main forms of irregular immigration: 
- Irregularly crossing of a border 
- Crossing the border in a seemingly legal way, using falsified documents 
one is not entitled to, or using legal documents for illegal purposes 
- Staying after expiration of the legal status (Portes / DeWind, 2007, p.288) 
4.3.2 Numbers of people crossing irregularly 
Heckmann claims that official statistics about irregular immigrant population in Germany 
come close to the true numbers because internal controls by law enforcement agencies 
occur very often – e.g. in comparison to Great Britain (Portes / DeWind, 2007, p.289). 
Therefore, it is more difficult that an irregular stay becomes permanent or long-term. 
Welfare organisations and churches have recognised the existence of a population of 
irregular migrants who need help. Social workers working with such people often can help 
for the estimation of the size of this population (Portes / DeWind, 2007, p. 292).  
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PART II 
5 Germany 
5.1 Who are “they”? 
5.1.1 Gastarbeiter, (Spät)Aussiedler, refugees 
Among the main groups of immigrants in Germany are “Gastarbeiter”, family members, 
“Aussiedler” and refugees. Gastarbeiter were seen as a temporary labor force that would 
come back to the sending country. But this did not happen because, as Max Frisch points 
out, that it came not just labor force, but also people with their families (Nuscheler, 2004, 
124). Between 1950s and 1960s Germany concluded contracts with Italy, Turkey and 
Tunis, which were sending countries. The Berlin Wall stopped migration flows from East 
Germany and this increased the need on labor force (ibid., p.137). 
Guest workers were recruited mainly for low-skilled jobs and had no political rights. They 
had an insecure residence status and separate social services. These measures were aiming 
at preventing permanent immigration (Schierup, 2004, p.146). In the mid-1970s to the late 
1980s after the introduced restrictions on immigration (Anwerbestopp) it still continued in 
the form of family reunion. The introduced measures to restrict this process were 
unsuccessful partly because of the employers who wanted foreign labor and partly 
because of the legal system protecting family rights (p.146).  
Aussiedler has the right to immigrate to Germany according to the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz). They are German citizens or persons, who have German nationality and 
have lived in the Eastern areas of the country before 1945 14. After 1990 with the increase 
of the immigrants, refugees and the fears of immigration flows to Germany, it was created 
a new definition “Spätaussiedler”, which aimed at decreasing the number of immigrants 
e.g. through tests in German and subsidies, which could make them stay in the sending 
country (Nuscheler, 2004, 131). Integration problems were very common in the 1990s. At 
that time Spätaussiedler were coming from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Geddes, 
2003, 83). Their education and qualifications were often not acknowledged, which made 
their inclusion in the labor market more difficult. On the other hand, their children had 
                                                 
14 Definition of Aussiedler, http://www.sign-lang.uni-
hamburg.de/projekte/slex/seitendvd/konzepte/l50/l5046.htm, (accessed 25.11.2011) 
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language problems, which created additional integration problems. Some of them had 
drug problems or were connected with criminal activities. 
The number of refugees increased four times between 1988 and 1992. Still in the 1980s 
court decisions aimed at decreasing this number. The interpretation of the refugee law in 
the Court changed. A refugee status could be given if there is an impartial assessment of 
the persecution danger and not just “fear of persecution” in the home country. Nuscheler 
criticizes this practice and explains that this downgrades the Geneva Convention on 
Human Rights which uses the fear as reason for the refugee status (2004, p.130).  
Reasons for immigration can be different and difficult to identify. In the beginning of the 
thesis were presented some theories, which focus on the economic aspects and explain 
some reasons why people migrate. At the same time, they can only explain certain aspects 
of the irregular migration. As Massey explains, migrants might be sent from their families 
or may have calculated that they will earn more money abroad. But once they enter the 
EU in an unauthorized way or overstay the legal period, this makes them irregular.  
5.1.2 Undocumented migration 
Although the German regulated market has always been a good example against the 
informal markets in Southern Europe, nowadays the number of small enterprises and 
deregulations makes informal employment often reality. Undocumented workers might be 
irregular migrants, legal entrants without work permit or asylum seekers waiting for a 
decision. Wilpert and Laacher (1999) point out other examples: young adults from 
Turkish origin or people who came legally through family reunion and are waiting for 
work permits (in Schierup, 2004, p.154). In most cases low-skilled unemployed people are 
taking part in the informal sector. 
5.1.3 Social exclusion 
German employers try to restore the flexible labor supply from the guest-worker period 
through this new type of employment and the informal sector. The dual labor theory 
recognizes the role of the employers in the process of migration as migrants are the best 
group for low-skilled jobs. According to Schierup, the protection and inflexibility of the 
German labor market create crisis in the German welfare state (2006, p.155). A result 
from this is the economic and fiscal crisis and privileged and marginalized positions for 
employees. Bommes (2003) explains that the welfare state takes care of the basic needs 
for the excluded people and is no longer providing equity (in Schierup, 2006, p.155). 
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Migrants are more often part of the marginalized group. According to him, they are more 
exposed to social exclusion because of lower education, training, job experience as well as 
discrimination. Low qualification is also a result of the past institutional discrimination in 
the guest-worker period. Discrimination is connected with ethnic exclusion and racism 
(ibid.).  
Irregular entries 
The flow of successful attempts to cross the border is measured by the German Border 
Police. The authors refer to asylum statistics as an indicator for "successful" illegal 
crossing of the border. Although one can cross the border illegally, an asylum procedure 
could be started and he / she obtains a (temporary) legal status. This is an interesting 
feature of the asylum migration in Germany (Portes / DeWind, 2007, p.291). 
5.1.4 Statistics about irregular migrants in Germany 
Immigration flows are complex, migrants have different backgrounds and reasons to 
move. It is therefore very difficult to estimate the exact number of the irregular 
immigrants. On the other hand, an important role for the estimation have the birth and 
death rates, overdue stay or applications for a legal stay (Schneider, 2012, p.78). Marriage 
and an asylum application could be also a way to end illegality (Marx in Schneider, 2012). 
Irregular transit also creates another group of irregular immigrants. Estimations about 
irregular migration play an important role for further political actions (ibid.).  
In the statistics of Eurostat irregularly present people are those one who entered the 
country in an irregular way or they had proper entry documents, but overstayed. German 
Bundespolizei provided Eurostat with data. According to these data, 50.250 person were 
caught for an irregular stay in Germany (Schneider, 2012, p.80). 
Table 1 – Identification of irregular staying TCN by nationality, 2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 
Total 53.695    49.555    50.250 
Turkey 6.675  5.610  5.565   
Afghanistan 880    2.665    3.700 
Irak 4.715    4.530    3.060 
Serbia 5.920    2.590    2.920 
Vietnam 3.010    3.010    2.680 
Russian 
Federation 
2.415     2.085  2.125    
China 2.565  2.285  1.975  
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Repubic of 
Kosovo 
:  1.605  1.935  
India 1.420  1.615  1.615   
Iran 1.090    1.205    1.605 
Other 
nationalities 
24.970    22.340   23.050 
The sequence of the most important natonalities is based on 2010 
Source: Eurostat (rounded data) in Scneider, 2012, p.80 
Refoulment happens when immigrants at the borders are not allowed to enter the country. 
According to Eurostat statistics, the number of such cases decreased since 1997. In 2000 
there were 52.257 refoulment cases and in 2009 2.980 such cases (Scneider, 2012, p.80). 
According to the author, an important reason for this is the decrease in the number of 
refugee-seekers. Among such other factors are the EU enlargement, the Schengen area 
entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Switzerland which allowed the free movement 
without border controls.  
Figure 1 – Total of refoulment cases, 2000-2010 
 
Source: 2000-2007: Bundespolizei / CIREFI; 2008-2010: Eurostat (rounded data) in 
Schneider, 2012, p.81 
 
The next table shows where most people facing refoulment were coming from in 2010. 
Turks constitute the biggest number, they are followed by Chinese and Russian Federation 
citizens. 
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Table 2 – People who were sent back, main nationalities, 2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 
Total 7.215  2.980  3.550 
Turkey 980  420  445  
China 405  260  335 
Russian Federation 295  265  275  
Serbia 1.450  100  245  
Ukraina 110  75  165 
Nigeria 235  215  140  
FYROM Macedonia 530  35  120 
Phillipines 60  35  110 
India 125  90  100 
Brasil 165  110  95 
Other nationalities 2.825  1.370 1.480 
Source: Eurostat (rounded data) in Schneider, 2012 
The sequence of the most important natonalities is based on 2010 
 
According to Düvell / Vollmer 2001 (in Schneider, 2012, p. 84) another way for going in 
illegality is when an asylum application is rejected. Statistics on asylum conclusions could 
show us the number of possible irregular immigrants. The second table represents the 
citizens who are most probably forming groups of irregular migrants (ibid., p. 84).  
Table 3 – Negative ruling by the court of first instance, by nationalities, 2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 
Total 11.465  17.090  34.955 
Serbia 1.350  665  4.800 
Iraq 1.445  3.100 3.015 
Afghanistan 195  645  2.775 
FYROM Macedonia 85  70  2.475  
Republic of Kosovo :  1.275  2.170  
Turkey 1.075  1.410  1.645 
Syria 460  690  1.620 
Iran 505  525  1.285 
Russia 560  590  1.240  
Vietnam 1.035  1.345  1.145  
Other nationalities 4.795  6.825  12.840 
Source: Eurostat (rounded data) in Scneider, 2012, p.84 
The sequence of the ten most important nationalities is based on 2010. Formal rulings 
(e.g. cessation of proceedings due to application withrawal or ruling according to the 
Dublin procedure) are part of the negative statistics by Eurostat. 
 
If the asylum application is rejected, according to the German law, the applicants can take 
legal actions. In 2010 more than 46% of the rejected applications were appealed in court. 
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This means that more than half of the rejected applicants stay in touch with the 
institutions. 
Table 4 – Total of the rulings on asylum applications, 2005-2010 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 48.100 30.760 28.570 19.335 26.855 45.400 
positive rulings 3.120 1.950 7.870 7.870 9.765 10.450 
negative rulings* 44.980 28.805 20.705 11.465 17.090 34.955 
*Rulings according to the Dublin procedure are part of the negative rulings in Eurostat 
statics (in contrast to national statics on asylum). 
Source: Schneider, 2012 
 
I will take a look at the domestic policy. According to Moravcsik, it is essential in order to 
understand interstate relations (see first part). Domestic policy is also connected to past 
legacies and policies. 
5.2 Main developments of the German migration policy 
(1) Migration was an important question between the political parties. In West 
Germany the far right had a limited success in the 1950s and the 1960s. But this is 
not the case nowadays. The Christian Democrats had adopted a restrictive line on 
order to provide an alternative to the xenophobic movements. This is the reason for 
drafting a restrictive foreigner law in 1990 (Green, 2004 in Menz, 2010, p.168). 
Churches had a more centrist position and the employer organizations saw 
advantages in the labor migration in the 1990s. Moravcsik explains in his theory on 
national preference formation, how important social groups are for the 
development of national policy (see part one) 
(2) At that time temporary labor migration schemes were introduced. Menz explains 
that they were mostly concerning people coming from Central and Eastern 
European countries working in agriculture and construction. Compared to this, the 
Green Card for employing highly skilled migrants was not very successful (p.169). 
This can refer to the new economics of labor migration that considers that 
Governments can influence migration through labor market regulations and 
policies (see part one). The Süßmuth Commission made a proposal for a point 
system for labor migrants and an annual quota to be included in the migrant law. 
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This did not become part of the law because of the opposition of the Christian 
Democrats. 
5.2.1 Politization 
According to Geddes, the question on migration is an issue of debate between the 
left and right parties still in the 1970s. He gives the example of the left Chilean 
refugees coming in the 1970s and and the fears of the right parties that they would 
bring communism in Germany (Thränhardt in Geddes, 2003, 86). Geddes claims 
that Aussiedler were not very popular in the left and they were seen as supporters 
of the right parties. One of the political parties came to the 1999 elections with the 
motto “Yes – to immigration, No – to double citizenship”, which attracted lots of 
voters (see also Nuscheler, 2004). It played also an active role in adopting the 
Citizenship Law in 2000. Article 16 of Germany's Basic Law (giving right to apply 
for asylum) was also a topic of debate between the Christian Democratic Union 
and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Nuscheler, 2004). As a consequence, 
it was amended and restricted the right to enter Germany to seek asylum. It offered 
only temporary protection for war refugees coming from former Yugoslavia 
(Schierup, 2004, p.148).  
The increase in the number of the asylum-seekers in the beginning of the 1990s 
caused a big public debate. Helmut Kohl as a chancellor (Christian Democratic 
Union) was advocating a common EU approach to border control and asylum 
policy as well as sharing of the costs of migration costs ("burden-sharing"). 
According to Hollifield and Joppke, organizations on human rights, churches and the 
discussions in the society had influence on the political process for improving the legal 
status of the immigrants. According to Kleger, it is important that the topic on human 
rights gain on influence in the last years (Nuscheler, 2004, p. 157). 
If we go back to Moravcsik’s theory, the important actors for national preference 
formation here are left and right parties, employers, churches and organizations on human 
rights (see first chapter). On the one hand, in times of unemployment and xenophobic 
feelings, parties were introducing restrictive measures on migration and on the other hand, 
actors like churches, organizations on human rights or the independent Süssmuth 
commission were trying to convince the society that migration is needed. 
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(3) The fall of the birth rates will create labor market shortages that are already to be 
seen in sectors for highly skilled and low payed unattractive jobs. Lots of scholars 
hope that immigration will solve this problem. Menz doubts that migration is the 
only solution for the demographic challenge to the welfare state. First, he points 
out that after one generation the birth rates of the migrants are equal to those in the 
host society. Second, replacing the "missing generation" will take about 20-25 
years and in the meantime the states will need more migrants who will encounter 
political resistance (p.195). According to a UN study, Germany will need 487.000 
migrants a year (Grimblatt, 2003 in Menz) in order to maintain a constant 
population of working age. Therefore, Menz is very sceptical about the incoming 
immigration as a solution to the problems. 
5.2.2 Country of non-immigration? 
(4) Germany changed its perceptions for its identity. It declared in its official 
documents for a long period of time that it is not a country of immigration 
(Geddes, 2003, 4). The Süssmuth Commission played also a role in the change of 
this attitude15. Its report dwelled on the integration problems and proposed 
solutions for improvements. An important aspect is the recognition that Germany 
needs immigration. One of the main strategies in this case is the search for 
qualified migrants (http://www.migration-info.de/, see also Menz, 2010). The 
economic and demographic situation is imposing the need for immigrant labor 
(Schierup, 2004, p.150). This refers to the dual labor market theory, which claims 
that migration is caused by the economic situation in the modern economies and 
governments do not have the ultimate powers to control the flows (see first 
chapter). 
Before this report the Citizenship Law entered in force in 2000 which introduced 
the principle of ius soli instead of that one of ius sanguinus. This means that 
foreign citizens can become German citizens if their parents have been settled 
legally in Germany for at least eight years (Nuscheler, 2004, 156).  This shows that 
Germany slowly began to accept that it is a country of immigration. It was also a 
                                                 
15 it is an independent commission on integration including scientists and representatives of important social 
groups in the society, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 49 
consequence of the Social Democrat-Green coalitions tries to reform naturalization 
and citizenship conditions (Schierup, 2004, p. 148). 
5.2.3 From Foreigners’ policy to the Immigration Act 
(5) Permanent migration was seen as a threat to Germany's national identity and 
social cohesion. Before the adoption of the Citizenship and Immigration Act 
Germany had “foreigners policy” (Ausländerpolitik), which was aiming at 
temporary integration of migrants and their families. The shift to a multicultural 
society did not happen all of a sudden (Schierup, 2004, p.145). Trade unions, 
church groups, migrants associations and the Green party began to look at 
immigration as permanent and saw solutions of the migrant problems in equal 
rights for everyone and a possible citizenship to immigrants. In the beginning of 
the 1990s the federal and Länder authorities introduced measures for "temporary 
integration" in the schools, but at the same time, they prepared the children for an 
eventual return to their country of origin. 
The Immigration Act (2004, Zuwanderungsgesetz) introduced measures for 
immigration of highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs and continued the halt of 
low-skilled labor from 1973. Foreign graduates of German universities may 
receive a permission to stay and look for a job. The law established also a new 
federal office of Immigration and Refugees. Integration courses are introduced for 
foreign residents in Germany. As an aftermath of the terrorist attacks provision for 
deportation and surveillance are introduced (Schierup, 2004, p.151). 
After accepting that Germany is an immigrant country, lots of debates about 
assimilation, integration and citizenship arose. But with large numbers of incoming 
Aussiedler and Übersiedler, it imposed restrictive measures (Schierup, 2004, 
p.151). 
5.2.4 Germany- citizenship 
Until the 1913 law on citizenship each region had its own regulations on citizenship. It 
remained in force until 1998 and it was ethnically based. At the time of the division West 
Germany had the ambition to speak on behalf of the whole Germans who defined also the 
ethnic concept of citizenship. Art 116a of the Basic Law allows access to ethnic Germans 
from Eastern Europe to its territory. Art.16 of the Basic law is also very liberal and it 
guarantees the right to political asylum. The citizenship concept of the West German 
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Federal Republic was not universal and had a specific geographical range (p. 63). 
Germany lost its colonies in 1918 and it was not expecting returning settlers. Therefore it 
conceived any labor migration as temporary. The end of the active labor recruitment 
(Anwerbestopp) showed that Gastarbeiter did not return to their countries of origin and 
migration continued mostly in the form of family reunion. The fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the war at the Balkans in the 1990s caused big migration movements to Germany. On the 
other hand, East Germany was trying to create national identity through the rejection of 
fascism and building on the communist ideology. Later it called for constitutional 
patriotism. Anyway, non-ethnical and political-ideological identity was not very 
successful (Menz, 2010, p.65).  
5.3 Welfare system, labor market and underground economy 
In 2001 Germany had 7,3 million foreign residents, which amounted to nearly 9 % of the 
total population. This group consisted of Turks, naturalized immigrants and ethnic 
Germans coming from Russia and Eastern Europe (Menz, 2010, p.137). The Citizenship 
Act of 1999 and the Immigration Act of 2004 trying to manage migration represented the 
recognition that Germany is a country of immigration. Schierup points out that this 
process is not completed and issues like immigration, cultural diversity and minorities are 
highly controversial in the society. At the same time, the “social state” is in crisis (the 
model of full employment, high wages, short working hours and etc, p.138). The main 
elements of the welfare system (Sciortino, 2002 in Schierup, 2006, p.139) are compulsory 
social insurance; the family as the main care-giver and strong labor market regulations. 
According to him, the male breadwinner model is dominant and women have traditionally 
the housekeeping role. The welfare state model is important because it can shape the 
labor migration policies and the extent of integration for the migrants. The new 
economics of labor migration also consider the importance of government policies and 
their influence on the labor market (see first part). Some countries that have strong 
welfare states might tend to support restrictive policies in order to preserve privileges for 
nationals (Bommes / Halfmann, 1998 in Schierup, 2004). He mentions also the existence 
of underground economy that tries to evade the high costs of the employment model. 
Based on Offe's arguments (2000), Schierup (2006, p.143) draws the conclusion that long-
term unemployment in the conditions of global competition makes difficult the financing 
of the generous social insurance system. It gets even worse when the state tries to keep a 
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relatively high level of wages and social benefits, which it cannot finance. Globalization 
and the decrease in the working age population also exacerbate the situation. Schierup 
sees the need for reforms, but expects also a large opposition to the growing income 
inequality and declining welfare (2004, p.144). 
After the Second World War reconstruction and success came. The "economic miracle" 
brought high incomes, long holidays, short working hours and social protection for the 
most people in Germany. Due to globalisation, change of the welfare system and the 
settlement of guest workers, the situation changed. In addition to that, Germany did not 
want to accept the fact that it was a country of immigration. Birth rates and workforce 
were shrinking. Schierup sees the belated and incomplete reforms as conditions for ethnic 
and social exclusion (2006, p. 162). 
5.4 National preference building – actors 
Moravcsik explains in his theory the importance of the national actors for building the 
policy. Here are some of them in Germany: employers, government, trade unions and 
NGOs. 
Employers' organizations had interest in the guest worker system, but due to the 
established connection between migration and security and xenophobic attitudes, they did 
not gain influence (Menz, 2010, p.175). This was also difficult because of the divisions 
among the Christian-Democrats and the rising unemployment. In the early 1980s BDA 
(Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände – Confederation of German 
Employers) supported the end of the active labor market recruitment, restrictive border 
controls, repatriation measures and efforts for educating the second generation. Later it 
adopted position for quotas on legal labor migration under the influence of BDI 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie – Federation of German Industry).  
The German authorities favoured temporary migration in specific sectors like agriculture, 
building or catering. An example for this trend is the seasonal worker programmes, which 
are based on bilateral agreements with central and Eastern European countries. In 2001, 
278,000 seasonal workers came mainly from Poland as well as from Romania, Croatia 
and Hungary (Schierup, 2004, p.151). Another possibility is the foreign "contract worker". 
German companies rely on foreign companies to implement certain construction projects. 
They negotiate their work conditions with their non-German employers and this could 
save lots of costs for the German companies.  
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As a whole, the government supported the short- and long -term labor migration 
depending on the needs and more stringent procedures, which are to make asylum less 
attractive (Menz, 2010, p.176). At the same time, it was interested in minimum EU 
regulation, so that it can have more freedom at the national level (e.g. for establishing 
quotas). 
5.4.1 Lobby groups 
According to Menz, all actors can take part in informal lobbying. The influence of unions 
and employers decreased after a shift of authority in migration policy making from the 
ministry of labor and social affairs to the interior one (p.178). Although they are 
represented in two expert committees on immigration, their connections are not 
formalized. Humanitarian NGOs have even more problems. They have financial and 
organizational difficulties, as well as ideological differences. They can influence mostly in 
a soft way: through participation in public and sector hearings, and making publications. 
5.4.2 Trade unions 
The official position of the Federation of Trade Unions (DGB – Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund) has been favouring non-discrimination and antiracism. It has focused 
on the integration measures of the resident migrant populations. It supported highly 
regulated sector-specific labor migration, controlled by annual quotas, as well as long-
term migration. According to Menz, although trade unions had a good organizational 
structure and ideational consensus, they were not as active as the employers (ibid.). 
5.5 Measures against irregular immigration 
Schneider classifies a few types of measures aiming at prevention and reducing irregular 
immigration: 
- prophylactic measures 
- preventing illegal entry into the country at the borders 
- detection and control of irregular stay 
- termination of irregular stay 
Other important aspects of the measures against irregular migration are: 
- international cooperation 
- influence of the EU measures on the German policy 
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5.5.1 Prophylactic measures 
Information campaigns about the risks of irregular migration are part of these measures. 
The purpose is to make possible that irregular migrants stay at home. Germany has 
treaties with EU member states and as well as with third states (e.g. Turkey, Albania, 
Montenegro) which provide workers for certain sectors and periods (Schneider, 2012, 
p.41). In addition to that, Germany is having mobility partnerships with Moldova and 
Georgia which aim at preventing irregular immigration and supporting legal entry and 
stay, as well as development and cooperation on refugee protection. 
German provinces and the state are supporting projects on return and reintegration of 
migrants in their country of origin (ibid., see also Schneider / Kreienbrink 2010). 
Issuance of visas is seen as an important obstacle to irregular migration by Germany and 
other EU member states (Schneider, 2012, p.42). Institutions responsible for the issuance 
of visas are diplomatic representations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
provinces /Länder/ (see Parusel, 2010, p. 43). But still controlmeasures are important for 
preventing the counterfeit of visas. 
In order to prevent visa abuse and irregular entry the German Bundestag adopted a law, 
which creates a visa data system starting from mid-2013. It will contain information about 
persons who were convicted for crimes relevant to visum process (Schneider, 2012, p. 
43). 
5.5.2 At the borders 
Protection of the borders is aiming at preventing irregular entry into the country as well as 
smuggling and other criminal activities. The protection of the external borders is of great 
importance for every member state. According to the adopted Schengen Border Code16, 
the member states are responsible for the fight against irregular immigration, human 
trafficking, prevention of threats to the security, public order and health. In the 1990s 
Germany invested a lot in border control and increased the personnel of the Border 
ControlAuthorities (Dietrich, 1998, p.17). 
After December 21, 2007 there are no more border controls between Germany, Poland 
and the Czech Republic17. And when Switzerland entered the Schengen zone in 2008 
                                                 
16 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
17 Poland in Schengen zone, http://en.poland.gov.pl/Poland,inSchengen,zone,7248.html 
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there were no more border checks at the German-Swiss border18. Therefore there are no 
stationary controls at the land border. The Bundespolizei (Federal Police) is allowed to do 
this only at international airports. This means that refoulment is possible in general only at 
these places (Schneider, 2012, p. 46). The Bundespolizei can check at railway stations, 
trains and sea ports if people are having documents for legal stay in Germany. According 
to Schneider, the German concept for integrity border management is connected to the 
ideas of the EU for such management. It consists of pre-entry measures, external border 
control and police co-operation. 
According to the Schengen Border Code, there should be minimum control measures at 
the external borders of the member states if the documents have been counterfeited or not. 
These measures are applied to persons moving freely in the EU according to the 
community law (acquis communitaire) (art.7, para.2, Schengen Border Code19). 
Documents of third country nationals must be observed in detail (art.7, para.3, Schengen 
Border Code, ibid.) and be checked if they comply with the requirements for entry. People 
who do not fullfill the requirements for entry are subject to refoulement to the country of 
their usual stay (art.13, Schengen Border Code, ibid.). This can happen at sea and air 
external borders. If the identity of the passenger is not clear or the next flight to the home 
land is not on the same day, the German Federal Police (Bundespolizei) will keep the 
passenger in detention (see also Legislation summaries20). If the airport has a transit area, 
they could stay there until it is time for their departure (Schneider, 2012, p.47). 
5.5.3 Detection and control of irregular stay 
The Bundespolizei can search passengers and check their identity without a certain reason 
or suspicion 30 km inland for prevention of undocumented entry (§ 23 para.1, N3, see also 
§ 44 para.2 in Federal Police Act / Bundespolizeigesetz). If the police officers have the 
reason to think that the person has recently crossed the border, they can do identity checks 
inland (Schneider, 2012, p.50). Therefore, the Bundespolizei can do such checks at 
transitways, railway stations and airports. This is also the case of cross border motorways 
and railways. The checks do not happen systematically, but on a random principle. Also a 
knowledge of the place or experience with irregular migration is required. Random checks 
                                                 
18 Jorio, Luigi (2009) – “Swiss reflect on Schengen progress one year on” 
19 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006  of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
20 Schengen Border Code – Legislation summaries 
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can happen also after leaving the plane. The random character of these checks should 
distinguish them from the normal border control. 5689 unauthorized entries in Germany 
were detected at German airports and these passengers were coming mainly from Greece, 
Italy and Spain.  
There is a finance commission on illicit employment, which is part of the border 
administration. Irregular empoyment is seen as unacceptable because it takes away 
workplaces and social fonds do not receive money from these persons (Schneider, 2012, 
p.51). In addition to that, all the actors (employer, employee, clients etc.) can get a 
sanction for their involvement in this situation. In connection to irregular migration the 
commission is checking permission for work as well as documents for their legal stay. 
The law on illegal employment is the basis for the work of the commission. Therefore, it 
is focusing more on migrants and their work relation than on their residence permit status 
(Schneider, 2012, p.51).  
5.5.4 Termination of irregular stay 
The EU member states use different ways for termination of migrants’ irregular stay. 
Among the return measures, some countries use regularization measures (see Baldwin-
Edwards / Kraler 2009; Kraler 2011 and Riedel 2011). It can happen on rare occasions, 
that some people who are living in Germany without a residence permit can get the right 
to stay (Schneider, 2012, p. 55). As a whole, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is focusing 
on return measures for people, who are staying illegally in Germany. Legalizations are not 
foreseen as it is the case in Spain and Italy. Still there are possibilities for individuals to 
get a legal status. 
If an immigrant does not possess a residence permit e.g. it has expired or it was cancelled 
(§§ 50, 51 Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) he / she must leave Germany. Priority is 
given to the voluntary return. If this does not happen, measures for compulsory return 
come into force. The aliens Department takes care of checking the situation and 
organization of the deportation. 
5.5.4.1 Voluntary return 
In 1979 the programme REAG / GARP („Reintegration and Emigration Programme for 
Asylum-Seekers in Germany“ /  „Government Assisted Repatriation Programme“), which 
is mainly focusing on asylum-seekers, whose application has been rejected, was started. 
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The programme is providing assistance for their travel and its expenses as well as for their 
reintegration in the home country. People coming from countries which are important for 
Germany in a migratory and political aspect have priority (Schneider, 2012, p. 56). The 
amount of money for starting the reintegration process depends on the home country. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs issues every year a list of sending countries and the amount of 
that kind of contribution from Germany. The programme was reformed and irregular 
staying immigrants could also get assistance from the programme. They must take a 
document for their crossing of the border from the Aliens Department 
(Ausländerbehörde). In this case the Aliens Department can decide if it will issue the 
document orif  it will issue an order for deportation. 
In addition to the mentioned programme, the provinces (Bundesländer) provide also 
support for return of irregular staying migrants (Schneider / Kreienbrink 2010, p. 66 and 
p.65; see also Kreienbrink, 2007, p. 93). 
5.5.4.2 Deportation 
With the message for deportation, the person is granted also a period in which he / she 
could voluntarily leave the country (§§ 58, 59 Residence Act). Persons who must leave 
the country can be arrested after a court order (§ 62 Residence Act). 
Depending on the case, the involved institutions are varying. They could be the Central 
Alien Department, the departments of the Länderpolizei, the Inner and Justice 
administration of the Bundesländer (in case of detainment) and Bundespolizei in case of 
accompanied deportation. The Länderpolizei (State police forces) is not conducting 
accompanied deportations abroad. The deportation is connected to a ban on return in 
Germany. This ban could be lifted after a certain period by applying for it (see § 11 
Residence Act). A limitation of this period could be refused due to criminal activities 
against peace, humanity or a war crime. 
There are some problems in connection to compulsory deportation. One aspect might be 
that migrants are not ready to travel away and they do not cooperate with the authorities 
(Schneider, 2012, p.57). A disease, lack of money or a suitable transport connection might 
be other reasons for problems in returning to the homeland. On the other hand, 
communication with diplomatic or consular organs of the sending countries might be 
difficult, e.g. in connection with clarification of the identity or of the issuance of missing 
documents (see also Kreienbrink 2007, p. 115.).  
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In some cases, deportation of groups could be temporarily postponed for six months 
because of humanitarian reasons or because of political interests of Germany. After this 
period and after a consultation with the Ministry of Interior the persons concerned might 
receive a residence permit (§§ 60a para.1, 23 para.1 Residence Act).  Still the supreme 
Länder authority (Landesbehörde) can decide to deny a permit to some persons, e.g. 
because of criminal acitivites or an affiliation to a certain group. 
Postponement of deportation for individuals can happen e.g. because of a ban on 
deportations to the home land, lack of transport connection, longer times for preparing the 
travel documents, inability to travel due to a disease. Another case is if the information a 
person can give is needed in the court. Humanitarian reasons or the public interest might 
cause the postponement. However, postponement of deportation does not give the right 
for residence (Schneider, 2012, p.58). 
 
Some other situations for receiving a residence permit for irregular residing persons 
According to the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) some irregular staying persons can 
get a residence permit because of humanitarian or political reasons or some other one 
related to international law. They are not part of the acquis communitaire. 
The Supreme State Authority can decide in accordance with the Residence Act (§ 23 
para.1 Aufenthaltsgesetz) to issue a residence permit for certain groups of immigrants 
(religious or ethnical one) due to the above mentioned reasons. This happens after a 
decision of a commission comprising representatives at the Bundesländer und Federal 
level (Parusel, 2010, p.26). In 2006 the commission decided to give the right to stay to 
third country nationals who must leave the country, but they are economically and socially 
integrated (Schneider, 2012, p. 59). This precedes the introduction of a regulation dealing 
with integrated immigrants (Grandfather Clause / Altfallregelung, §§ 104a and 104b 
Aufenthaltsgesetz). It was introduced in accordance with the EU directive in 2007 and was 
in force until 2011. A condition for receiving a residence permit was eight or six years of 
legal or tolerated (geduldet) stay until 1. July 2007 (deadline) (Schneider, 2012, p. 59). In 
addition to this, other pre-condition were oral knowledge of German and the absence of 
criminal activities. On the basis of this regulation the residence permit was issued for two 
years. A possibility to prolong it was given when he / she was able to earn independently 
his / her future living.   
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The minister of internal affairs and the senators of the internal affairs (Innensenatoren) at 
the Bundesländer adopted a regulation on young people in 2010. According to it, 
teenagers and adolescent people could receive a residence permit if they fulfilled some 
conditions (e.g. if they have graduated or undergone some training qualification and if 
they are well integrated). Their parents could also receive a residence permit if they were 
good integrated and they could secure the living of their family (Schneider, 2012, p. 60; 
see also Parusel, 2010, p. 36).  
5.5.5 International cooperation 
An important aspect for the fight against irregular migration are readmission agreements. 
Germany signed readmission agreements with Denmark, Sweden and Norway in 1954 and 
1955. This was long before the EU started signing such agreements with third countries. 
The first steps were initiated by two recommendations from the EU institutions on 
lessening differences on national bilateral agreements with third states (Billet, 2010, p. 
47). After Yugoslavia was not more existing, Germany concluded readmission agreements 
with Bosna and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The 
readmission agreement with Serbia and Montenegro is based on the agreement with 
Yugoslavia, but still EU agreeements have a priority. Germany has such agreements with 
Bulgaria, Romania and Albania as well as with the Maghreb states Algeria and Morocco 
(Schneider, 2012, p. 63). Germany has signed thirty bilateral readmission agreements with 
other countries. 
Police agreements include cooperation between institutions of the neighbouring states so 
that criminals, who try to escape, could be chased across the border and in the 
neighbouring state. Policemen who are after the criminal can just detain him / her at the 
territory of the neighbouring country and give him / her to the police authorities of the 
country they are at. Policemen who are at the territory of the neighbouring country can use 
weapons only in cases of self-defense. Each treaty defines how many kilometres in the 
neighbouring country the policemen are allowed to chase the criminal. 
Cross border cooperation is playing an important role and in 2005 Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, the Netherlans and Austria signed the Prüm Treaty. One of its goals is 
cross boarder cooperation which should support the fight against irregular imigration. It 
focuses on the automatical exchange of data between the signatory states (e.g. DNA data, 
fingerprints, data abour motor vehicles). After a German initiative the main points of the 
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Prüm Treaty became part of the EU acquis with a Council Decision (Schneider, 2012, p. 
65). 
Germany and FRONTEX 
At the European level Germany is part of the FRONTEX agency. The agency is 
responsible for the organisation and coordination of missions at the external Schengen 
Borders. There are joint operations which are organized for the fight against irregular 
migration21. Another possibility are Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT). They are 
built up when a lot of third state nationals want to enter a member state at its external 
borders. The first case was Greece in 2010 (Schneider, 2012, p. 67). The Bundespolizei 
took part in this team for handling asylum seekers flows at the greek-turkish border. 
Policemen of the Bundespolizei are regularly taking part in seminar, projects and 
workshops organized by FRONTEX. 
The organization is also supporting readmission operations22. It co-finances them as well 
as coordinates national measures. Germany is taking part in this activities and in 2010 it 
organized four flights to Georgia and Kosovo (Schneider, 2012, p. 69). After that there 
were 16 flights. As a whole there were 226 persons who were sent back to their countries. 
In addition to that, FRONTEX is increasing its co-financing part and this leads to saving 
for the German part.   
5.6 Europeanization 
According to Menz, the Schengen Treaty was a result of the Franco-German cooperation. 
Being the Chancellor, Kohl was aiming at developing a common EU regulation 
mechanism of asylum and migration (Menz, 2010, p.185). This was not only due to pro-
European attitude, but also because of the big number of asylum seekers and refugees in 
Germany. German activities for "burden sharing" encountered opposition from European 
Governments that wanted to preserve their state monopoly in these areas. The German 
Länder also doubted the right of the federal government to represent them at negotiations. 
As the bottom-up Europeanization did not prove to be a fruitful strategy, the Kohl 
Government changed the approach. The decision was to introduce restrictive domestic 
measures on the asylum topic. After the Dublin Convention, the German lawmakers 
                                                 
21 FRONTEX, Mission and Tasks, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks 
22 Return, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/operations/return 
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adopted the concepts of "safe third countries"23 and "safe country of origin"24. They were 
criticized for being contradicting or undermining the right on political asylum declared in 
the constitution. Under the argument that the Basic Law must be amended in order to 
harmonize it with the Schengen and Dublin rules, the Kohl Government wanted to 
persuade the society and break the opposition. German activities lead also to the creation 
of the third pillar of justice and home affairs in the Maastricht Treaty. Although the 
German government (Red-Green) was supporting European initiatives in refugee and 
asylum policy, that was not the case for (labor) migration (Menz, 2010, p.187). Austrian 
and Germany opposed together the Commission's proposal on labor migration by TCNs as 
they wanted to preserve the national policy. The negotiations ended unsuccessfully in 
2002. Both countries claimed that the Commission had no authority to regulate the labor 
market access.  
The trend is towards restrictive external border control measures and avoiding undesired 
forms of migration such as asylum seekers and refugees. Non-state actors try to influence 
policies and to form preferences, but this depends on their internal organization and 
cohesion. Trade unions put an emphasis on the integration of the resident migrants and 
business lobbies are interested in the qualities of the incoming migrants. The migration 
issues have also turned into question of political debate (Menz, 2010, p.190). 
Germany tries to share the immigration burden with the other member states and to find a 
solution to the refugee crisis from the end of the 1990s through cooperation and 
tranferring competencies to the European level. On the other hand, it tries to create a 
buffer zone of Central and Eastern European countries, which could receive a part of the 
immigration flow. In Spain and Italy, the adoption of the acquis led to the focus on issues 
such as external borders control and less on external controls. The second one is 
connected to the informal sector and its benefits to employers and immigrants (Geddes, 
2003, 152). 
                                                 
23 An application for asylum in a European country could be rejected because the applicant „already enjoyed, 
could or should have requested and, if qualified, would actually be granted asylum in another country”, Safe 
Third Countries, Myths and realities, p.8, see http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/403b5cbf4.pdf 
24 „ A non-EU country designated as a safe country of origin may be considered as such for a given applicant for 
asylum only if he/she has not put forward serious reasons suggesting that it is not safe because of his/her 
personal situation, in view of the conditions required for claiming refugee status in accordance with Directive 
2004/83/EC “ in Council Directive 2005/85/EC – Minimum standards for procedures for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigrati
on/l33140_en.htm 
 61 
 
6 Italy 
6.1 Immigration to Italy 
6.1.1 History of migration 
Until 1970 Italy was a country of emigration (Menz, 2010, p.68). Italians were heading 
mainly to Northern Europe (Germany, France, Benelux and Switzerland) after the Second 
World War. Most of them were coming from the South, which was considered positively 
by the political elites. This was expected to solve varoius political and social problems 
connected to the large unemployment rates in Southern Italy. The expectations were that 
migrants' remittances and investments in the homeland would contribute to the economy 
(ibid., p.163). 
In the 1980s the foreign population rose to 2,5 million people, which was about 4,6% of 
the total resident population in Italy. Immigrants were coming from Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and Europe. They were mainly occupied as domestic workers, in building, in 
agriculture and in the private service sector (Schierup, 2006, p.164). 
With the increase of immigration and the following discussions at political level Italy 
began to pay more attention to border control and labor market access (Menz, 2010, 
p.233). The far right gained influence, as migrants were perceived as security threats. The 
legacy of the weak migration policy still has influence on shaping the current migration 
policy. 
In the 1980s most of the migrant population was coming from non-OECD countries and 
was in most cases undocumented (clandestini). Becoming a member of the Schengen zone 
and the EU was followed by introduction of restrictive immigration control and a populist 
discourse in Italy, which made the social inclusion of the migrants more difficult. In 
addition to that, the dual labor market, familistic welfare system and "political and 
administrative system imbued with clientilistic networks of power" contributed to the 
social exclusion of the migrants (Schierup, 2006, p. 164). Being in such situation of 
marginality migrants are called extra-communitarians (extracomunitari). The term also 
describes "their persistent status of non-belonging to the Italian nation" and is associated 
with immigrants coming from poorer countries. 
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6.1.2 Laws and problems of migration policy 
The Law 943 of 1986 points out the three main priorities in the Italian migration policy: 
implementation of restrictive border control, integration of existing migrant communities 
and management of labor migration by the creation of migration quotas based on the labor 
market needs and the country of origin (Menz, 2010, p. 67). Italy used the latter as “carrot 
and stick” depending on their participation in joint migration control, border enforcement 
and deportation. This law was amended by the 1990 legge martelli, the 1995 decree no. 
489, the 1998 Law on the regulation of immigration and the Living Conditions of 
Foreigners (EMN, 2005, Irregular Migration in Italy, p. 12). Although these acts are 
perceived as liberal, the recent policy is restrictive with legalization campaigns for 
irregular migrants (p. 68). The 1998 Consolidation Act and the Bossi-Fini Law (20.July, 
2002) continued the restrictive trend. Few asylum seekers are recognized and the Italian 
authorities have often made attempts to make them move across the Northern border. The 
South was not prepared to deal with the incoming refugees. 
Problems of immigration policy 
The immigration laws between 1986 and 2005 are in most cases ambiguous and open for 
interpretation at the local level. The first Italian law on immigration in 1986 was putting 
an accent on the equal treatment of foreign and Italian workers and right to family 
reunion. At the same time, it adopted sanctions against employers hiring irregular 
migrants. Restrictive policy on entry was adopted later producing obstacles to legal 
immigration. At the same time, the labor market demanded cheap workforce.. The stricter 
migration control was supposed to give equal rights for migrant and Italian workers. But 
on the contrary, it encouraged irregular migration (Schierup, 2006, p.189). Migrants were 
excluded from social rights and the bureaucracy implemented the policy in a confusing 
way (Mingione, Qassoli, 2004 in Schierup, 2006). The police and local authorities created 
conditions for reproduction of informal practices. Practices are very often acting against 
the law ignoring unwanted provisions and creating new ones (Zincone, 2009, p.45).  
The 1990 Martelli Law (see also EMN, 2005, Irregular Migration in Italy, p. 12) set the 
main points for the Italian immigration policy: a stricter border control, integration of the 
existing migrant communities and regulated labor migration. Menz criticises that there is 
an implementation gap at the local level and that legalization programmes were 
accompanied the legislative measures (Menz, 2010, p.246; see also Zincone, 1998, p.53). 
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The 1995 Law provided three types of regularizations: for subordinate work, for family 
reunification and for registration on employment rolls (EMN, 2005, Irregular Migration in 
Italy, p.12). 
The Turco-Napolitano Law of 1998 aimed at integration and social inclusion of the 
immigrants. It came at the time when employers began to prefer regular instead of 
clandestine migration and it addressed the "long-term incorporation of migrants in the 
Italian society and welfare system" (Schierup, 2006, p.189). The law introduced a 
residence card, which guaranteed access to the welfare system. Among its provisions were 
equal treatment of migrant and Italian workers and access to social services. It partly 
separated the measures for work and residence permit and in this way it was easier for 
immigrants to legalize their status in Italy. The law was adopted after pressure from the 
EU for restricting irregular immigration. It adopted measures for expelling irregular 
migrants and for conclusion of readmission agreements with the sending countries. The 
author is critical of the law and its implementation. Restrictive interpretations allowed 
only a small number of migrants to obtain a permanent residence card (see also Zincone, 
1998, p. 58). The quota system for labor migrants was administered on temporary basis 
and this led to an increase in the number of irregular migrants (Irregular Migration in 
Italy, 2005, p.13). They were also used as a carrot-and-stick policy toward sending non-
EU countries in connection to control measures (Menz, 2010, p.247). Albania, Tunisia 
and Romania were rewarded for arresting trans-Mediterranean immigrants, by allowing 
annual quotas of 6.000 labor migrants each (in 2000). The annual quota for non-EU labor 
migrants for the same year was set at 45,000 including Egypt, Moldova, Nigeria and Sri 
Lanka (see also EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 
64).   
The Bossi-Fini Law (2002) went further in the restrictive direction. It connected 
obtaining a residence permit with the possession of a work permit, which criminalized 
undocumented migrants (Schierup, 2006, p.191). It gave control and expulsion power to 
the police and strengthened local administrations. However, after the law was adopted, the 
largest legalization programme took place, which regularized about 650.000 migrants. All 
mainstream parties opposed it and few NGOs supported it (Menz, 2010, p.248; see also 
EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p.64). 
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Regularizations do not constitute a real immigration policy, but are an emergency 
intervention (EMN, 2005, Irregular Migration in Italy, p.14). 
Citizenship 
Italian citizenship concept is based on ius soli and ius saguinis. Constant residents who 
were born in Italy can choose Italian citizenship on their 18th birthday. Ethnic Italians 
receive it automatically. People with Italian ancestors can apply for citizenship, but they 
must have been residents prior to the 18th birthday. There are few traditions of 
assimilation or integration of foreign residents, and due to the regional and historical 
difference, it will be difficult in the future to define Italian identity and citizenship.  
6.1.3 General trends – irregular immigrants 
Schierup looks at the general trends of immigration in Italy based on statistics from 
Calavita (2004), Blangiardo (2004), Garosi (2004), and Zanfrini (2004). According to 
these, older immigrants were coming from Morocco and the Philippines and newer ones 
mainly from Eastern European countries like Romania, Ukraine and Moldavia. They 
represented also the largest group of undocumented migrants, which became clear with 
the legalization from 2003 (2006, p.167). In most cases, new migrants enter the country in 
an irregular way and then become part of the underground economy. The older migrants 
are often legal residents and have a regular job. In most cases, there is an equal gender 
distribution with the exception of services such as housekeeping and taking care of the 
young and the elderly, in which women are more heavily represented. Most work permits 
are given to workers and only a small part of it to asylum-seekers, which according to 
Schierup shows the underdeveloped refugee and asylum policy. Another trend is that 
immigrants in the North are more often legalized in comparison to the South, where there 
is a larger number of undocumented migrants (2006, p.168). 
6.1.4 Statistics about irregular immigrants in Italy 
Contrary to the famous image of irregular immigrants trying to enter Italy by boat, 
according to statistics most of the undocumented immigrants are overstayers (about 60-
75%). Another significant group is formed by people avoiding controls at the Northern 
borders, international airports and ports (Fasani, 2009, p. 14). On one hand, Italy attracts 
immigrants with the increase in labor demand and the existing shadow economy. On the 
other hand, it is a transit country for immigrants trying to reach countries such as 
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Germany, Great Britain and France (ibid.). Some of the rejected asylum seekers start an 
unauthorized residence in Italy (Fasani, La Dolce Vita, p.10). 
The specific geographic position (proximity to wealthy and unstable regions, peninsular 
conformation in the Mediterranean Sea) of Italy plays a major role for migration flows. 
One of the main entry channels is the Italian-Slovenian border, which is mainly crossed 
by Eastern Europeans, as well as by migrants coming from Central Asia, Middle East, 
Indian Subcontinent and Eastern Asia. The Italian-French border is mainly crossed by 
Africans coming from the Strait of Gibraltar through Spain and France. Southern regions 
are very often reached by boats. They arrive form the coast of former Yugoslavia and 
Albania and Northern Africa. In the recent years the number of undocumented immigrants 
coming from the Balkans decreased due to the stabilization of the region. On the other 
hand, the number of irregular crossings from Africa and Libya increased because of the 
instability there (Fasani, 2009, p. 15; see also Fasani, 2010, p. 4-8). 
The situation of undocumented immigrants in 2005 is the following: 
“In 2005 more than half of the undocumented migrants were citizens of 
some Eastern European country (in particular, Albania, Romania, 
Ukraine and Poland), almost one sixth was originally from Northern-
Africa (especially from Morocco and Tunisia), while Asia and Oceania, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America each represented around one 
tenth of the stock.”25 
 
With the EU enlargement EU citizens cannot be considered as irregularly residing, but 
they might not receive the right to work in the “old” member states. Each country can 
impose temporary limitations which are called transition periods (Fasani, 2009, p.50). 
According to Fasani, it is difficult to make estimations about the exact numbers of 
irregular immigrants, but looking at official data about undocumented immigrants who 
shore landed or those who were refused to enter could be useful (Fasani, 2010, p. 8). 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Fasani, 2009, p.15 
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Figure 2 – Undocumented immigrants shore landed and refused entry at the border, 1986-
2006 
 
Source: Fasani based on data from the Italian Ministry Of Internal Affairs 
 
According to him, the change in the values is due to the enforcement and not due to 
change in the flows: 
“Border rejections were fluctuating between 40 and 70 thousand per year in the ‘90s 
and have gradually decreased to 20-30 thousand in the last few years. Similarly, 
recorded shore landing dropped from 40-50 thousand per year in the late ‘90s to 15-
20 thousand in more recent years.” (Fasani, 2009, p.9) 
 
The figure below shows that most of the undocumented migrants are coming from Eastern 
Europe (53%). 17,1% are coming from North Africa, which is followed with 12,5% from 
Asia and Oceania and 8,7% from Latin America. 
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Figure 3 – Undocumented migrants by area of origin, 1st July 2005 
 
in Fasani, 2009, p. 51 
 
Information about amnesties and quotas can also provide information about the 
undocumented migrants. In 1990 12,7%  of the immigrants were coming from Europe. 
Their number increased in the 1990s and reached 59.2% of legalized immigrants. 
Albanian citizens were the main group of irregular residence between 1995 and 1998. 
Later Romanian and Ukrainians became the dominating groups with respectively 20.9% 
and 15.7% of the legalized population. The number of African residents decreased: in 
1990 it was 58,4% of the total legalizations and in 2002 it was 16,8%. In comparison to 
these numbers, irregular presence of Asian and South American immigrants appears more 
stable: in 1990, 21,6% of the legalizations were for Asian citizens, which number declined 
in 2002 (13,6%).  The percent of Latin Americans slightly increased in the same period: 
from 7,1% to 10,4%. 
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Table 5 – Legalized migrants: gender and nationality. Amnesties: 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 
 
in Fasani, 2009, p. 94 
 
According to statistics of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the “overstayers” 
account for 70% of the undocumented migrants in Italy in 2005.  These are people who 
entered Italy with a valid visa and did not leave after it expired. The next table shows that 
51-75% of the undocumented migrants in the period 2000-2006 were “overstayers”. The 
rest managed to avoid border controls (15-34%) or to shore land (4-17%) in the Southern 
parts of the country without being arrested. According to the authors, a higher level of 
border control would prevent entries of undocumented migrants, but it would not prevent 
migrants from overstaying their visas. 
Table 6 – Undocumented migrants residing in Italy, by entry channel (percentage). Years 
2000-2006 
 
Source: Italian Home Office (aa.vv. 2007) in Fasani, 2009, p.111 
Labor market statistics 
A national ISMU survey from 2005 looks at the empolyment status, occupation and 
monthly wage of migrants. There are three types groups of migrants, which are observed 
in the survey: documented migrants (who were already legal before the 2002 amnesty), 
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legalized migrants (in 2002) and undocumented migrants. 
According to the authors, these statistics help understand the the movement from 
irregularity to regularity and integration in the Italian society (Fasani, 2009, p. 54).  
Figure 4 – ISMU data: labor market status of immigrants in Italy, by legal status, 2005 
 
in Fasani, 2009, p. 55 
 
The number of unemployed inividuals varies in the different categories. It is about 8 
percent among the legalized and documented migrants and reaches 20 percent for the 
unauthorized migrants. The most inactive migrants (students or individuals looking after 
family / home) are among the documented migrants (14 percent). Their proportion is very 
small in the group of undocumented (2.5 percent) and legalized migrants (1 percent). This 
is due to the higher percentage of  students (4,1 percentage). In addition to that, a 
considerable part of the female documented migrants have their family or household as 
their main occupation (Fasani, 2009, p. 54).  
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6.1.4.1 Difficulties for making statistics in Italy 
Statistics on irregular migrants population are very important for the political debates as 
well as for judgement of the implementation policies (Fasani, 2009, p.25). But the process 
of drafting official statistics in Italy was slowed down because politicians did not want to 
recognize that migrants were to be an important part of the country’s future and the 
perception that migrants are just temporarily in the country (ibid.). There are some 
secondary sources for drawing the picture of irregular migrants: 
- through numbers of regularized persons 
- “the work monitoring activities carried out by the INPS (National Social Security 
Institute), INAIL (National Disability Insurance Institute) and by the Provincial 
and Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor to counteract illegal labor involving 
numerous irregular foreigners; 
- the activities of the Nucleo Ispettivo del Comando dei Carabinieri (Inspection Unit 
of the Italian Military Police) at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which 
also controls the workplace; 
- Ministry of the Interior data regarding expulsions, rejections and repatriations; 
- ISTAT (National Statistical Institute) data (EMN, 2005, Irregular migration in 
Italy, p.10) 
The first report on immigrants in Italy was published in 2007 from the Home office and 
the Ministry of Labor. Due to the reluctance of the government lots of private research 
institutes played a central role in producing statistical information, e.g. Fondazione ISMU, 
Istituto Cattaneo and Emilio Reyneri from University of Milan (Fasani, 2009, p.26). 
But still the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs has made some statistics on the 
undocumented migrants in the country (ibid., p. 98). 
Table 7 – Undocumented migrants identified by Italian police forces within the italian 
territory, 1997-2006 
 
 
The number of documented migrants increased with more than two thousands between 
2003 and 2007. The percentage of undocumented migrants living in Italy among the total 
foreign born population was about 16 percent in 2005, 18 percent in 2006, and 9 percent 
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in 2007. 
Table 8 – ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Italy 
(thousands), 2003-2007 
 
in Fasani, 2009, p.93 
There are also regional differences in the migrant population. About 75 percent of the 
undocumented migrants are settled in Northern and Central Italy. The table shows that, 
among migrants in the South, the percentage of irregular migrants to the South is higher 
(26,9 percent) than in Northern and Central Italy (Fasani, 2009, p. 33). 
Table 9 – ISMU estimates of documented and undocumented migrants living in Itly, area of 
residence, 1st July 2005 
 
 
in Fasani, 2009, p. 93 
6.1.5 Fears 
Between 1900 and 2000 Italy had more than 30 million emigrants. Now Italy is an 
immigration country for many people (Santel / Bade p.105). This entails lots of changes in 
political, economical and cultural aspect. According to Santel, racism also takes rises. In 
Italy it is mainly focused on the Albanian minority, which Italians often connect with 
criminality, drug trade and prostitution. Fears about losing the national identity also rise. 
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Giacomo Biffi (the cardinal of Bologna) even proposed that Italy should accept only 
catholic immigrants in order to preserve its national and cultural identity (Santel in Bade, 
2001, p. 106). Islam, the religion that immigrants bring with them, is a point for hot 
political debates. The public debates focus not at topics like integration and naturalization, 
but mostly on immigration control, residence of irregular immigrants and regulation of the 
labor market. 
 
6.2 Italian Economy 
6.2.1 Overview 
Menz gives an overview of the Italian economy (2010, p.237): 
- lots of small firms, product competition based on price and not on quality 
- strong employment protection in large firms, tendency to dualism in 
employer relations in smaller firms 
- "moderate levels of social protection with a high concentration on pension 
provision  and low expenditures on education" 
- Short-term precarious contracts 
He also points out the regional differences in Italy. The North is more wealthy, it has 
almost full employment, iron, steel and automobile production, foot wear and textiles. The 
South is much poorer, as well as the islands of Sardinia and Sicily. They are economically 
active in agriculture, fishing and tourism (Confindustria, in Menz, p.238; see also Reyneri, 
2003, p.122). Northern employers are more active to labor recruitment in contrast to the 
Southern employers. 
Micro-companies account for 50% of all companies in Italy. This is a result of the 
attempts to avoid taxation and labor law that refers to certain employment levels. 
According to Chaloff (2004, p. 6) immigrants are to be seen mostly in gastronomy, 
tourism, health care, transportation, food processing, textile and furniture industries and 
agriculture (in Menz, 2010, p.238). Migrants are generally concentrated in the North and 
centre and have a diverse origin. Their number is lower in the South and on the islands, 
where they can mostly find irregular employment in the primary sector (ibid.). 
The employers' organizations (Confartigianano, Confcommercio and Confesercenti) are 
lobbying in favour of labor migrants. Their main interests are: more comprehensive 
approach on immigration regulation, improved integration of resident migration and 
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active management of labor migration due to economic and demographic reasons (Menz, 
2010, p.241). 
6.2.2 Regional differences and informal sector 
Schierup points out that it is very difficult to talk about Italy as a whole because there are 
differences between the regions in economic, political and cultural aspects. On the other 
hand, it is important to keep in mind that formal legislation differs from its de facto 
implementation and interpretation by the political-administrative system defined by 
clientilistic power relations (Schierup, 2006, p.165). 
Informal sector poses challenges 
The existence of the informal sector poses lots of challenges in a long-term perspective, 
e.g. to the financing of the welfare system and the pension system. At the same time, 
management of immigration is connected to conflicting interests. The EU wants to restrict 
irregular immigration, but the informal sector welcomes the cheap migrants labor. 
Inspections from authorities are complex and insufficient (Irregular Migration in Italy, 
2005, p. 20). Reyneri points out that underground economy did not start with the 
immigration flows but already existed (2003, p.132). Migrants are seen as the main cause 
for the problems in the Italian society and they are the scapegoat for populist movements. 
Berlusconi used the immigration issue in his re-election campaign. On the other hand, 
NGOs pay attention to the humanitarian side of the issue and work a lot with immigrants 
in Italy (Schierup, 2006, p.194).  
6.3 Welfare system and labor market 
According to Schierup, Italy has a familistic welfare system and a large number of family 
and small firms. The family is an important element of the welfare system involving 
relations of interdependence, responsibility and labor (Saraceno, 1994 in Schierup, 2006, 
168). Women in the family have the function of the main carers of the young and the 
elderly. Depending on the local practice the caretaking role may be extended to sisters, 
brothers etc. The male breadwinners are responsible for their "dependants" according to 
the labor law. The retirement benefits are work-related and there is no public income 
support for the young with no work experience. Therefore, they rely on their family. 
The labor market is male dominated and it privileges middle-aged, less educated men in 
larger firms who are heads of households (Reyneri, 1999 in Schierup; see also Reyneri, 
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2003, p.121). Women and educated young people are often unemployed and depend on 
their family for a long time. According to Fasani (2010, p. 4) the welfare state has a role 
for the flow of immigrants not because of its generosity, but because of the demand for 
affordable household workers so that shortcomings in the Italian welfare system are 
compensated. On the other hand, undocumented migrants are the group that is most 
excluded from the welfare system. They are “entitled only to emergency medical care and 
to a limited extent of education for their children” (Sciortino, 2004, p. 124).  
6.3.1 Gender and migrant domestic workers 
Job opportunities for native Italian women have been improving. A full-time job for 
women in administration, education and science was facilitated by the universal access to 
education (Schierup, 2006, p.171). Nevertheless, the welfare regime remained static as 
well as the traditional role of women as mothers in the family. This defined the need for 
their substitutes – migrant domestic workers, mainly women. They can take care of 
elderly relatives, children and / or the household and "live-in" (to live with the family). 
Domestic workers used to be employed in the urban middle- or upper class families in 
Italy and are thus a status symbol (Reyneri, 2003, p.123). Nowadays, this is a common 
strategy for the middle-class families. Until the 1970s native women were available for 
this sector, but they found more opportunities for work in the industrial or service sector 
and insisted on hourly pay instead of "living in". Therefore, migrant women were 
preferred for this job. At the same time, migrant women have a weak legal and social 
position, which makes their services cheaper and often leads to irregular employment. 
This may provide more possibilities for exploitation and employer control (Schierup, 
2006, p.173). 
6.3.2 Demographics 
Job opportunities for women outside their home have increased, but still they had their 
responsibilities at home. In this situation some women chose to work instead of getting 
married and / or having children. As a consequence, the birth rates are decreasing. 
Calavita predicts (2004 in Schierup, 2006) that the lack of working population will define 
the "need for large-scale immigrant labor" in certain sectors and occupations (p.174). It is 
estimated that the labor market requires about 2,2 million immigrants a year for the next 
thirty years. Still youth unemployment is a big problem, especially for the South. 
Therefore, young unemployed native Italians rely on the family. They are not encouraged 
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to take low-status jobs, and therefore only immigrants take them (see also Reyneri, 2003, 
p.121, p. 128). Immigrants have also replaced also Italians in the underground economy. 
6.4 Irregular migrants on the labor market 
6.4.1 Pull factors 
By joining the Schengen area Italy harmonized its visa and asylum law with the other EU 
member states. Immigration to Europe became even more difficult, which made the 
immigrants look for alternative illegal ways for entering the "Fortress Europe" (Santel / 
Bade, 2001, p.110). 
Santel pays attention to the pull-factors that are very important for immigration to Europe. 
The fast economic development led to a deficit in labor force and at the same time, a high 
level of unemployment – around 12% in Italy (20% in Southern Italy). This was due to the 
fact that many Italians were not willing to take less paid, physical jobs. Immigrants from 
the "third world" were filling these labor gaps. In contrast to the immigrants in the 
European countries in the 1950s and 1970s, the immigrants are not employed in the 
industry sector, but in the agriculture or service sector. About one third of the cleaning 
workers are migrants. Further possibilities for work are enhanced by the informal sector 
and shadow economy in restaurants, retail trade and fishing. 
6.4.2 Informal sector and irregular migrants 
The dual economy in Italy is, on one hand, characterized by large industrial enterprises,  
e.g. steel production and shipbuilding, mainly in the North. State employment in the 
administration and service institutions provides also high social status and favourable 
retirement conditions (Schierup, 2006, p.176). On the other hand, there is a wide network 
of small firms and workshops, which have more traditional activities in the South and 
more technological in the North.  
The labor market of the formal sector was one of the most regulated in Europe (e.g. for 
hiring practices and job security, in Calavita 2004, Schierup, 2006). Employees in state 
administrations and industrial enterprises have high wages and privileged pension 
conditions. At the same time, the informal sector is very large and employed a quarter of 
the total labor force in the late 1990s (see also Reyneri, 2003, p.131). Small and family 
firms often rely on irregular labor force, avoiding in this way the regulations of the formal 
sector. Reyneri points out that the solution to unauthorized migration is a strict policy 
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toward the domestic market. He uses the latin proverb “Cura te ipsum” (Heal yourselves), 
which refers to first solving the problems inside the country and then looking at reasons 
causing irregular immigration outside the country (2003, p.139). 
The informal sector provided supplementary income for some households (work in 
restaurants, workshops etc.). It was characterized through rural-urban and interregional 
migration. With the restructuring of the Italian economy in the 1970s the participation of 
irregular migrants in the informal sector inreased (Schierup, 2006, p.178).  
With the relocation of traditional industries (e.g. metal and textile), the Italian economy 
experienced lots of difficulties. Small and family firms contributed to the recovery of the 
economy and to the rise of the gross national product. But the success was also due to tax 
evasions, informal recruitment and employment practices (Schierup, 2006, p.179). 
6.4.3 Regional differences in migrant occupation 
The occupation of immigrants varies across regions, wages and sectors. Particular migrant 
groups are heavily represented in certain sectors e.g. Filipina and South African women in 
domestic work and North African men in building and construction (ibid., p.180). 
Irregular migrants often work in the agrarian sector in poor conditions. At the same time, 
some immigrants may obtain formal contracts in this sector in order to get a residence 
permit. After that, they may take a better-paid job in the industry or migrate to the North. 
There are less job opportunities in the South, but there is also less police control and less 
bureaucratic involvement compared with the North (p.181). In the informal sector 
immigrants can easier reconstruct their (ethnic) social networks. In the North the informal 
economy is not so dominant and there is more bureaucratic control (p.182). In spite of 
this, there is a high demand on migrant labor in industry and service.  
In the 1980s and the 1990s migrant workers were extensively recruited in the informal 
sector. At that time, there was high unemployment in the South and also in the working-
class in the North. Being in the informal sector without regular permit and work 
conditions migrants were always in a situation of insecurity. As they often work for sub-
minimal wage and employer do not pay for social security, migrants represent a cheap and 
flexible labor force (p. 183). According to Reyneri (1998 in Schierup, p.183; see also 
Reyneri, 2003, p.122) the underground economy in the receiving state is causing the 
irregular migration. In the media, poverty and underdevelopment in the sending countries 
are mainly represented as the dominant reasons for irregular migration. The informality in 
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the labor market that offers work for irregular migrants is often overlooked in the public 
discourse. 
Reyneri (2001 in Schierup, 2006, p. 184) observes that the proportion of irregular 
migrants working on irregular basis decreased. It was due also to the regularization 
measures in the beginning of the millennium. Still irregularity varies across sectors. It is 
still dominant in agriculture and building. There are more migrants which are regularly 
hired in domestic work and manufacturing (Zanfrini, 2004 in Schierup, 2006, p. 184). The 
attitude of employers in medium and small business changes – they regard immigrants as 
regular and permanent labor force. 
6.4.4 Exclusion of migrants 
Borders in Italy exist not only in geographical sense, but also in reference to the welfare 
state that in big extent excludes migrants from the social services. In most cases migrants 
seem to be ineligible for public housing and the creation of reception centres for migrants 
with the Turco-Napolitano 1998 Law 40 was not implemented as envisaged. The informal 
sector accounts for 25 up to 40 percent of the GDP and migrants without work permit can 
easily get a poorly paid employment in it. Receiving work permits is impeded through the 
heavy bureaucracy and poor administration. Getting a permanent residence is also not 
easy – six years of residence prior to application are needed. Recognition rates for asylum 
seekers are very low. They are not available to the public and asylum is not present in 
media and public debates (Menz, 2010, p.234). Citizenship is ethnically based. In spite of 
this, there are some exceptions for residents born in Italy. 
Closed borders and many opportunities for working in the underground economy pull lots 
of unauthorized migrants. Furthermore, working irregularly and living without documents 
produces negative attitudes among the locals. In contrast to activities like housekeeping 
and agricultural workers, street sellers are seen by the society as unnecessary. 
Furthermore, irregular migrants do not pay social insurance and may appear as claimants 
for social subsidies, which is used in populist way by some media (Reyneri, 2003, p. 137; 
see also Irregular Migration in Italy, 2005, p. 72).   
6.5 Measures against irregular migration 
Menz points out that laws are partially implemented. Legalization programmes occurred 
regularly between 1986 and 2006, in contrast to the restrictive intentions of the 
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Government. At the same time, police is arresting with a high media attention 
undocumented migrants (mostly foreign prostitutes). 
In its study EMN (2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 19) 
has described some practical measures undertaken by Italy to reduce the flow of irregular 
migrants. Measures vary according to the different stages: 
- Pre-entry 
- Entry 
- Stay 
- Ways for terminating irregularity 
6.5.1 Pre-entry measures 
Italy has signed some agreements with sending countries in connection to irregular entry, 
e.g. bilateral agreements on readmission and tackling irregular migration or on the 
regulation and management of labor migration flows (EMN, 2012, Practical responses to 
irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 19). Police agreemets are another aspect and they 
aim at developing “a joint action to combat the exploitation of irregular immigration and 
trafficking in human beings” (ibid., see also EMN Italy, 2010, Satisfying labor demand 
through migration. The Italian case, Idos, Rome, p. 35). 
The authors are critical towards the assumption that development cooperation can limit 
immigration. According to some researches, it may also have other effects. For example, 
if the cooperation creates development in poor countries, this may lead to an increase in 
the migration flow because more people can afford travelling abroad. 
Some of the main projects are “MIDA” (Migration for Development in Africa), “MIDLA” 
(Migration for Development in Latin America) and WMIDA (Migrant Woman for 
Development in Africa26). They aim at “enhancing the leading role of immigrants in the 
socio-economic growth of countries of origin, through the identification of sustainable 
pathways for channelling financial, human and social resources, and possible synergies 
between the territories of origin and of destination” (EMN, 2012, Practical responses to 
irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 21). 
Scholarships and contributions for university degrees are also part of the developement 
cooperation. Applications for scholarships are submitted by government authorities of the 
                                                 
26 IOM – “Engaging Migrant Women for Development in Africa” 
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Countries of origin of candidates at Italian Embassies abroad, and then the formal request 
is transferred to the Directorate General for Development Cooperation. There are mainly 
four fields of preferences for the studies (ibid., p. 20): 
- management of primary resources (water, agriculture, environment) 
- development of small and medium businesses (planning, financing, marketing, 
industrial design, production techniques) 
- strengthening of health sector 
- capacity and institution building (good governance and peace-keeping) 
The table below shows which countries receive development assistance. The countries 
which receive the most assistance are Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Palestina. As the table 
shows, sending countries are mostly the ones with medium income because these migrants 
can pay for the trip to the receiving state.  
Table 10 – ITALY. Immigrants’ countries of origin and countries receiving official 
development assistance - ODA (2009) 
Ranking foreign residents Ranking recipient countries of Official Development 
Assistance 
Countries Residents Income 
classes 
Countries Residents (nr 
and ranking 
position) 
Euros disbursed 
(thousands) 
Income 
classes* 
Albania 466.684 3 Afghanistan 3.372 (57°) 43.081 1 
Morocco 431.529 3 Ethiopia 8.350 (39°) 36.538 1 
China R.P. 188.352 3 Palestine 494 (97°) 28.038 3 
Ukraine 174.129 3 Albania 466.684 (1°) 24.574 3 
Phillipines 123.584 3 Lebanon 3.860 (53°) 17.903 4 
India 105.863 3 Mozambique 301 (107°) 16.688 1 
Moldova R. 105.600 3 Senegal 72.618 (15°) 13.084 1 
Tunisia 103.678 3 Sudan 2.436 (64°) 12.744 1 
Macedonia 92.847 3 Uruguay 1.643 (70°) 8.277 4 
Peru 87.747 3 Jordan 2.638 (60°) 8.207 3 
Ecuador 85.940 3 Iraq 2.547 (61°) 8.000 3 
Egypt 82.064 3 Egypt 82.064 (12°) 6.495 3 
Sri Lanka 75.343 3 Pakistan 64.859 (16°) 6.369 2 
Bangladesh 73.965 3 Yemen 218 (111°) 6.128 1 
Senegal 72.618 1 Somalia 7.728 (40°) 5.452 1 
*Classification of the Assistance Committee (DAC): 1: Least Developed Countries, 2: 
Countries with low income; 3: Countries with low and middle income; 4: Countries with 
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upper middle income. 
Source: EMN Italy. Elaboration on ISTAT data, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and OECD in 
EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 20 
 
Among the measures for pre-entry are awareness campaigns and preferential quotas. Since 
1998 countries which have signed readmission agreements receive preferential quotas for 
migration (ibid.). According to the author, in 2006, 2008 and 2009 Flow Decrees27 the 
quota was higher than the real number of migrants and in the recent years vice versa. In 
2010 Egypt and Moldova received the highest quota (8.000 and 5.200 places). Bulgaria 
and Romania are not taking part in the preferential quotas as they are EU member states 
and their citizens have the right to free movement. 
 
Co-operation in the field of work 
Immigration and economic migration 
Italy has linked efforts against undocumented immigrants with the management of 
economic migration. This concurs with the new economics of labor migration which 
states that governments can influence migration through labor market regulations (see first 
part).  If sending countries cooperate they receive preferential quotas. The 1998 Law 40 
(Turco-Napolitano Law) stated that for defining the quotas it is necessary to take into 
account the state of the labor market and the unemployment rate among natives and 
resident non-EU citizens. The Bossi-Fini Law of 2002 allowed regions to formulate 
requests for certain contingents (Menz, 2010, p. 236). Preferential quotas are given to 
some neighbouring Mediterranean countries such as Albania, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Somalia. They include seasonal workers, temporary limited contract workers as well as 
e.g. university professors and researchers (see Chaloff, 2004, p. 59). 
Italy has also signed agreeements on work with Morocco, Egypt and Moldova. The 
agreement is supposed to regulate the connection between labor supply and demand. 
One of the central parts of the agreements is the exchange of information about the 
demand of the Italian labor market and the suitable qualified workers who can fill these 
workplaces. There is also a special list of workers who are ready to immigrate to Italy 
(EMN Italy, 2010, Satisfying labor demand through migration. The Italian case, Idos, 
Rome, p.36). 
                                                 
27 Flow decrees are issued by the Italian government and establish the quota of employees needed on the labour 
market 
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It must also provide reciprocity in the treatment of citizens – foreign citizens in Italy are 
provided equal treatment as Italian citizens in the sending country. Another important 
aspect is the selection of qualified foreign workers and the promotion of their professional 
and linguistic training (EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian 
case, p.28). 
The bilateral agreements also contain executive protocols which deal with the 
implementation of the treaty. The agreement concerns all types and cases of workers 
(EMN Italy, 2010, Satisfying labor demand through migration. The Italian case, Idos, 
Rome, p. 36). 
6.5.2 At the borders 
According to FRONTEX, 8289 irregular persons were detected at the Italian borders 
between January and September 2009. In 2010 their number decreased to 2866 persons 
(EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 41). Due to the 
situation in the North African countries in Spring 2011 their number increased to 60.000 
people. Border controls have become so important for the Italian authorities that the 
authors describe it as “a living matter” (ibid.). In the following paragraphs there is an 
overview on the measures for control on sea and air borders. 
Sea and Air borders 
The Italian authorities use modern technologies in order to prevent irregular migration at 
the sea borders. Among these are a monitoring system and new “technical and scientific 
equipment for the analysis of identity papers and travel documents that are able to tackle the 
increasingly sophisticated technologies of document fraud (stereoscopic microscopes and 
light sources)” (ibid.). 
A study conducted by the SEA Milan Airports Management Society (Malpensa and Linate) 
in 2010 shows what types of irregular migration can be found at the airport (EMN, 2012, 
Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 45): 
- Irregular immigration from outside the Schengen area (still predominant); 
- Irregular immigration in the Schengen area; 
- Irregular emigration to outside the Schengen area (especially to the United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada); 
- Cases of readmission due to the Dublin II Regulation 
Ways for irregular entry could be: 
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- The use of false documents; 
- The substitution of person (i.e. the use of authentic documents, but belonging to another 
person); 
- The use of the transit area to change destination (ibid., see also Reyneri, 2003, p.3) 
Some factors for irregular migration are visa policies, availability of particular routes, 
smugglers and corrupt practices in third countries. Except from national authorities and 
supranational agencies such as FRONTEX, the authors emphasize the importance of air 
carriers in the fight against irregular migration. Upon police request air carriers are obliged to 
give information about passengers. Smugglers play an important part in irregular entries. 
They organize the details of the trip and can provide tickets and false documents. With the 
increase of cheap flights smugglers might change fast flight routes in case of difficulties 
(EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 45). 
Foreigners without proper documents (visa, documents for purpose of stay etc.) can be 
rejected by the border police and escorted to the borders. If the persons are asylum-seekers 
they will not temporarily be rejected because of humanitarian reasons (EMN, Irregular 
Migration to Italy, 2005, p. 16). Air, sea and land carriers must return passengers without 
proper documents to their departure point or country of origin on carrier’s expenses. 
Falsification and trafficking of visas is seen as a big challenge to the Italian authority 
(EMN, 2012, Visa policy as migration channel in Italy, p. 24). Italy started investigating 
visas in 1998. Further investigations involved Algeria, Albania, Argentina, Byelorussia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Somalia, Turkey and 
Ukraine. The latest cases involved Kosovo Albanians and Morocco citizens. 
6.5.3 Irregular stay 
In 2009 a “security package” entered into force. The Law no. 94 of 15 July 2009 (see also 
Fasani, 2010, p. 16) concerned migrants and public security. It criminalized the irregular 
entry and introduced a fine of 5.000 until 10.000 euro. Any public officials who did not report 
irregular migrants are also subject to punishment. A permit of stay is also needed for certain 
services (except from healthcare and education). Another condition is that in the case of 
family reunion certain living conditions regarding accommodation must exist. Most of the 
measures of the security package are described as restrictive. In 2011 the European Court of 
Justice rejected the criminalization of irregular entry. The reason was that the punishment of 
imprisonment did not comply with the EU Return Directive: 
“While, in fact, Italian law provides the forced accompaniment of the 
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foreigner to the national borders by the public authority as ordinary mode 
of expulsion, the European directive provides for a voluntary return within 
a period of 7 to 30 days.” (EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular 
migration: the Italian case, p. 58) 
Undeclared work is another aspect of irregularity. It concerns tax collection and social 
insurance. A Committee for the Emergence of Undeclared Work was created under the 
auspices of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the regional and provincial 
committees for the emergence of the underground economy. Its main aim is the fight against 
undeclared work. According to the Penal Code employers who are hiring irregularly are 
subject to penalty including a fine and a possible imprisonment (ibid., p. 58).  
6.5.4 Termination of irregular stay 
Most often possibilities for getting out of irregular status are assisted voluntary return or 
regularization of the status. 
6.5.4.1 Regularizations 
The first administrative measure from 1980 was in the form of a departamental circular 
and concerned 5.000 foreign citizens. The first legalization programme was launched in 
1986. It was estimated that out of about 400.00-500.000 irregular migrants only 118.706 
used the possibility to get a residence permit. Many of them were afraid of being fired. It 
was also better for the employers to have illegal workers because in that way they did not 
need to pay insurances (Bade, 2001, p.113). In the beginning the regularizations 
concerned mainly Africans, later Eastern Europeans were more interested, and in the last 
regularization in 2009 the number of Ukranians was higher than that of Morrocans and 
Moldovians (EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 64 
and p.49 from this work; see also Bade, 2001, p.113 and Reyneri, 1998). The peak of 
regularization was in 2002 (about 700.000 applications of which 647.000 were approved) 
and in 2009 (about 300.000 applications of which 230.000 were approved). 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 – ITALY. Applications submitted for the regularization of irregularly staying non-
EU citizens (1980-2009) 
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Regulation 
 
Year of measure 
Applications for 
regularizations 
Approved 
applications 
Circ. Ministry of Labor 17.12.1979,  
8.3.1980, 2.3.1982, 9.9.1982  
1980-1982  
 
5.000 5.000 
Law 943 / 1986 and further extensions; from  
last Law 81 / 1988  
1986-1988  
 
113.349 105.000 
Decree Law 416 / 1989   
converted into Law 39 / 1990  
1990 234.841 222.000 
Decree Law 19 / 1995   
converted into Law 617 / 1996  
1995 258.761 246.000 
Pres. of Council of Ministers Decree  
16.10.1998 and Decree Law 113 / 1999  
1998 250.747 214.000 
Law 9.10.2002 no. 222 / 2002;   
Law 30.07.2002 no. 189 / 2002  
2002 704.350 647.000 
Decree Law 78 / 2009   
converted into Law no. 102 / 2009  
2009 295.126 230.000* 
* provisional data (June 2011) 
SOURCE: EMN Italy. Elaboration on data from the Ministry of the Interior in EMN, 
2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 64 
 
These programmes underlined the importance of the migrants as labor force as well as the 
fact that they also have rights. The repetition of the programmes proves, on one hand, that 
border controls are not so efficient and, on the other hand, it gives a signal for incoming 
immigrants that there is a chance for them to become legal. Santel underlined that Italy 
should pay attention not only to border control policy but also to integration policy (Bade, 
2001, p. 113). 
Reyneri sees as one of the main problems with regularizations that after expiration of the 
residence permit migrants go back to the underground economy. According to him, one 
third of the migrants who were regularized in 1990 worked in an irregular way two years 
later (2003, p. 134). In some cases an irregular working status started immediately after 
the regularization because many of the employers continued hiring migrants in an 
irregular way.  
Spain has also had legalization programmes as well as programmes for migrant 
recruitment. It has a treaty with Morocco that about 300.000 migrants per year are 
supposed to get a visa. Madrid was also to take care of transportation and accommodation 
within 9 months. Italy went further and defined a quota system based on which 63.000 
visas were calculated for the year 2000. About 6.000 visas for Albanians and 3.000 for 
Moroccans and Tunisians were included in this calculation. The rapid economic 
development in the North caused the need for more labor force. At the same time, another 
factor for this was the low birth rate (Santel, 2001). 
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The regularisation programmes lead to a smaller rate of irregular migrants and a bigger 
rate of officially registered foreigners. And still compared to Germany and France the 
numbers of foreigner are still not so high (ibid.). 
6.5.4.2 Assisted (voluntary) return 
It happens very often that immigrants are trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea by boats. 
According to the media, Italian authorities caught 1700 boats and detained more than 
40.000 irregular immigrants in 1999 (Menz, 2010, p.108, see also Fasani, 2010). 
Therefore, Italy (as well as Spain) signed a treaty with Morocco for returning the 
immigrants. Furthermore, they supported Morocco financially in securing its borders. In 
October 2000 Italian helicopters were stationed in Tirana and Vlore in order to patrol the 
Albanian coast. 
Italy has bilateral agreements on repatriation with sending countries. In exchange for their 
co-operation the sending countries are supposed to receive quota for workers. In spite of 
the agreements, sometimes results are not very effective (EMN, 2005, Irregular migration 
in Italy, p. 24). 
It depends on the individual and their personal decision to return voluntarily to the country 
of origin. The voluntary return consists of three stages: preparation for departure, travel 
and accommodation details and reintegration programmes. Once repatriated there is no 
bar against later for return to Italy (EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: 
the Italian case, p. 70). 
Assisted voluntary return for victims of trafficking was regulated with the Law no. 286 / 
98. This group was extended to asylum applicants, refugees, holders of a residence permit 
for humanitarian reasons and ex Dublin Convention cases. EU minors working as a 
prostitute are also subject to assisted return. This is not the case for immigrants with a 
decree for expulsion (EMN, 2009, Programmes and strategies in Italy fostering assisted 
return and re-integration in third countries, p. 31). Between 1986 and 2000 there was a 
return fund for foreign workers. It applied to them if they had paid at least one 
contribution to the National Institute for Social Pensions. A new return fund was 
established in 2009 within the Ministry of Interior. Half of the fund consists of payments 
of the immigrants for issuance and renewal of residence permits, and the rest comes from 
contributions from the EU (EMN, 2009, Programmes and strategies in Italy fostering 
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assisted return and re-integration in third countries, p. 32). The table below shows the 
evaluation of the control measures. 
Table 12 – Synoptic evaluation of control measures related to getting out of irregularity 
 
Title of 
measure 
Users: 
Type 
~ 
Number 
Geogrphical 
Impact 
~ 
Time 
 
Effectiveness* 
~ 
Traditional** 
 
Learnt lesson (a) 
~ 
Suggestions fo rthe policy-makers 
(b) 
Regularizations Irregular 
migrants and 
employers 
~ 
Hundreds of 
thousands 
 
 
Third countries 
~ 
Immediate 
 
 
High 
~ 
Traditional 
(a) lack of exceptionality of the 
measure 
(b) since it amend the lack of annual 
quotes, some experts propose a 
regularization system on a personal 
basis 
 
Assisted 
voluntary 
return 
Migrants in 
difficult 
situation 
~ 
Hundreds 
 
 
Third countries 
~ 
Immediate 
 
 
High 
~ 
Traditional 
 (a) Low effectiveness in the recent 
past for the lack of inclusion of 
regular immigrants 
(b) Perspectives to strenghten 
according to available ressources 
* Effectiveness: achieving the actual goal of the project (high, medium, low);  
** Innovativeness: added value in respect to past practice and legal provisions (traditional, experimental) 
in EMN, 2012, Practical responses to irregular migration: the Italian case, p. 70 
6.5.5 National preference building - actors 
The main aspects of the migration policy vary according to the ruling party – external 
border controls, legal immigration and integration of migrant communities. The Left is 
more liberal. It wants to avoid social exclusion and exploitation in the informal economy 
through regularizations and more possibilities for legal migration (Menz, 2010, p.235). 
The Right is more restrictive, e.g. the adoption of the Bossi-Fini Law. Due to the 
economic interests of the business, which it supports, it has a more pragmatic approach to 
labor migration. This is an example how the national actors influence the national 
preference (Moravcsik, see first part). 
Another example for the division among Left and Right parties are the detention centres 
(1998 Law). Irregular migrants must be detained, but the methods for that are not 
specified in the law. In addition to that, “they are run by voluntary associations (such as 
the Red Cross) and patrolled by the police” (Zincone, 1998, p. 57). Undocumented 
residents, people crossing the border in an irregular way and people who are requested to 
leave the country are subject to detention in the special centres. Residents who came in an 
irregular way before the law was enacted are an exception because they are ordered to 
leave and not detained. According to Zincone, it depends on local police authorities to 
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decide if irregular migrants must be put in detention.  She criticises the law as a “self-
contradictory”, ambiguous and discretionary piece of legislation “ and looks at it as a 
compromise between Right and Left Parties (ibid.): 
“The Right wanted clandestine immigrants caught at the borders to be put 
in prison when it is impossible to identify and expel them, and the Left was 
not prepared to consider clandestine entry as a crime.” 
Unions and pro-immigrant associations also have some influence. Members of the unions 
who are part of key committees can influence the migration policy-making, or this can 
happen because by law the opinion of the unions is to be heard (Zincone, 1998, p. 72).  
6.5.6 Europeanization 
At the domestic level the immigration issue was vastly discussed in the public in the 
beginning of 2000s. At that time political pressure was mostly coming from Schengen 
countries that insisted on stricter border controls. With the increase of immigrants entering 
the EU through Italy, the interest in migration policy grew. As for asylum issues, the 
Italian government accepted top-down Europeanization because of its underdevelopment 
at national level. If we refer to Moravcsik’s theory, this can be an example of negative 
externalities for both countries. The EU member states wanted burden sharing and Italy 
adopted the regulation because of their underdevelopment at national level and the arising 
public debates. Thus co-operation was possible. Examples for this are the establishment of 
reception centres for asylum seekers and introduction of electronic transfers of asylum 
seekers' dossiers as in the Netherlands (Menz, 2010, p.250). Italians offered that a quota 
system is introduced at European level, which is connected to readmission agreements and 
cooperation in "managing" migration (ibid., p.250). Member states did not want to give 
this right to the EU and the EU labor migration directive 2001 was not launched 
(unsuccessful bottom-up Europeanization). The Italian approach to immigration includes: 
border control, integration of resident migrants and regularizations. Asylum is a recent 
topic, which is not very developed and is restricted by the Bossi-Fini Law. It is mostly a 
product of top-down Europeanization. NGOs are not very successful in influencing policy 
shaping. 
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7 EU and irregular migrants 
7.1 EU’s “fight against illegal immigration” 
The fight against irregular immigration is a main priority of the EU28. With the accession 
of the new member states the external borders of the EU moved to the South. Boswell and 
Geddes point out that irregular migration is also a consequence of the national policies 
aiming at restricting irregular entry (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p. 33, also Guiraudon /  
Joppke, 2001, p.5). The restrictive provisions make legal routes for entry to Europe more 
complicated. Another factor supporting the persistance of the irregular migration is the 
possibility to live and work in Europe on an irregular basis. The labor market welcomes 
cheap migrant labor. The topic of irregular migration is connected to regulation of 
external borders as well to the regulation of the labor market and welfare states of the host 
country. 
7.1.1 EU actions against irregular immigration 
In the last decade the EU has placed an emphasis on the “fight against illegal 
immigration". However, the process of illegal immigration is very complex and it is not 
only in the interest of the migrants themselves, but also of future employers (Geddes, 
2011, p. 126). 
The EU Commission defines the most important elements of EU strategy against irregular 
migration in its "Policy Priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third- country 
nationals"29: 
- co-operation with non-EU states, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Mediterranean countries 
- integrated border management, development of e-borders that require carriers 
such as airlines to communicate data contained in passengers' passports to the 
immigration authorities 
- fight against human trafficking 
- combating illegal employment and reducing informal work 
                                                 
28 COM (2006) 735 final, The Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European 
migration policy 
29 COM (2006) 402 final, Communication from the Commission of 19 July 2006 on policy priorities in the fight 
against illegal immigration of third-country nationals, Summary 
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- return policy and Return Directives 
- improving information exchange 
- carriers' liability  
We can see that the main priorities are border security and external dimensions of 
migration policy. The EU tries to involve the neighbouring countries in its migration and 
asylum policy. This can happen as part of the accession process (Croatia and Macedonia). 
As for non-candidates for membership, the EU uses development aid and economic 
assistance. According to Massey and Capoferri (2007), the changes in controlling the 
external borders affects the way in which the smuggling networks act. This causes further 
changes in the border controls and further adaptations from the network. It seems like an 
arms race, which will end when one of the participants is exhausted (Heckmann in 
Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p.134). 
As irregular migration is seen as a threat to security, the EU sees this as challenging the 
territorial borders. Taking into account also the exploitation of migrants by traffickers and 
smugglers, the EU sees the solution in making the external border controls tougher 
(Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p.135). 
7.1.2 Policy options for the EU 
States decide through admission policies who can enter their territory, for what reasons 
and for what duration. This defines the existence of irregular migration. According to 
Boswell and Geddes (2011, p.135), the EU has then three possibilities for its policies: 
- Tolerating irregular migration – reforms might be too expensive and possible 
migrants are needed on the labor market. However, irregular migrants may be 
exploited as cheap labor 
- Regularizing irregular migrants – migrants become part of the society through 
obtaining a legal status which is in coherence with immigration laws. 
Regularizations can lead to an increase in the number of irregular migrants as the 
newcomers hope that they will also obtain legal status at a certain point 
- Expelling irregular migrants – it is consistent with restrictive policies as well as 
border controls, admission policies and managed migration. On the other hand, it is 
expensive and time-consuming. 
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An important aspect of the EU policy toward irregular migrants is the return issue. The 
EU has spent millions of euro in measures concerning returning migrants and border 
security. 
 
Policy implementation  
EU's response to irregular immigration is its focus on external borders and co-operation 
with non-members states (e.g. from North Africa). However, the EU is not responsible for 
the policy implementation. It depends on the states and the administrative authorities. The 
EU tries to coordinate this through e.g. the Return Directive and FRONTEX. The 
Southern European countries argue that irregular migration is a common problem of 
Europe, which needs common solutions. Spain has developed an Integrated System of 
External Vigilance (SIVE) spending about 150 million euros between 1999 and 2004. It 
concerns the coastline of the Canary islands of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote and the 
Andalucian coastline (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p.145). 
Germany and Austria do not support the idea of regularization, which countries like 
Spain, Italy and Greece use relatively often. This measure and external frontiers’ control 
refer to the consequences of migration and not its causes. 
The regularization programmes concern Third State Nationals (TCNs) who are not 
citizens of the state of residence or another member state and do not complying with the 
rules of migration in this country. (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, p.145; see also Reyneri, 2003; 
Reyneri, 1998). 
7.1.3 Migration control 
Guiraudon and Joppke point out two possibilities of national policy responses for 
migration control: visibility at the border and in law enforcement, and remote control, 
delegating controls to third parties (Guiraudon / Joppke, 2001, p.12). In the late 1990s 
Spain installed a double fence on the border between Morocco and the colonial enclave 
city Ceuta.  It increased the number of border guards also. This is an example of highly 
visible border management. This was not the case in Germany. Looking at the recent 
memories of the Berlin Wall such methods were unacceptable. Here police presence was 
increased and random checks were allowed. Visibility can be very useful for electoral 
objectives because it gives an appearance of control and the feeling of security (ibid., 
p.13). 
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The second option is remote control. This means "externalizing" controls beyond national 
borders so that aspiring migrants or asylum-seekers do not reach the territory of the 
receiving country' (p.13). The methods might be visa regimes, carrier sanctions and 
cooperation with transit and sending countries. In this way states want to prevent 
unwanted migrants or asylum-seekers to reach them. Part of these measures is forcing 
airlines to check passengers' passports and visa. Germany signed agreements with Eastern 
European and Mediterranean states in the early 1990s for the return of undocumented 
migrants in exchange for financial help. With the Schengen acquis and the Amsterdam 
treaty cooperation between the states was further developed. 
7.1.3.1 FRONTEX 
It is important to note the difference between smuggling and trafficking. In 2000 the UN 
defined the second term as connected to coercion and deception (Geddes /  Boswell, 2011, 
p.130). Smuggling is assumed as voluntary. Their networks arise when there are people 
looking for irregular routes for immigration. 
Smuggling is one of the main issues connected to irregular immigration. According to 
some statistics around 1200 people may have lost their lives trying to reach Spain through 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
FRONTEX was set up in 2005 and it defines its main goals in its annual report (2007): "to 
strengthen the border security by ensuring the coordination of the Member States' 
activities in the implementation of the implementation of Community measures relating to 
the management of the external borders". It works also with other agencies like 
EUROPOL and CEPOL. 
Its main roles are30: 
- Carrying out risk analysis 
- Coordinating operational cooperation on external border management 
- Offering training to external borders guards 
- Serving as a platform for research relevant to border control and 
surveillance 
- Technical and operational assistance to member states 
- Coordinating (supporting) joint (return) operations 
                                                 
30 FRONTEX, Mission and Tasks, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks 
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- Providing a rapid response capability 
- Developing and operating systems for sharing information 
 
According to FRONTEX, borders exposed to most irregular crossing are: 
- land and sea borders of South-Eastern Europe 
- air borders in Western and Northern Europe  (Geddes, 2011, p. 124) 
In its annual report FRONTEX presents statistics which show the most preferred ways for 
some nationals to cross EU borders. Moroccan irregular migrants cross the sea as well as 
the land border of Spain. Chinese and Brazilian nationals are mainly detected at air 
borders and those of Algeria, Egypt and Somalia are mostly at the sea borders. Migrants 
from Serbia, Pakistan and Palestina are mostly seen at the land border (Geddes, 2011, p. 
124). 
Although the security aspect is important, it is not the only one which relates to irregular 
migration. 
7.1.3.2 The Return Directive 
The Return Directive (2008) is an important document and it is the first one adopted with 
the co-decision procedure. This procedure gives much more influence to the European 
Parliament in the decision-making procedures on some immigration and asylum 
questions. That was previously reserved to of the member states (Boswell / Geddes, 2011, 
p.140; see also Menz, 2010). The Return Directive followed the Hague Programme, which 
planned development in the immigration and asylum policy. It lasted three years after the 
original proposal of the Commission until the Directive was adopted. The aim was to 
introduce one procedure for the expulsion of irregular migrants. The member states can 
introduce more liberal rule in comparison with the Directive, but they cannot be more 
restrictive. 
7.1.3.3 The Labor Migration Directive 
This case example shows that countries are not willing to give up their sovereignty on certain 
topics. 
In 2000 the Commission started an initiative aiming at labor migration regulation at the 
EU level. This was met with resistance of the member states. The Commission wanted to set 
common criteria for the admission of third country nationals based on the market demand. 
Another proposal was the creation of a single application procedure for obtaining work and 
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residence permit, which was very progressive for some national legislations failing to link 
work and residence permits (Menz, 2010, p. 112). The Communication on open method of 
coordination31 was supposed to facilitate the exchange of best practices between the 
countries. 
A draft directive was issued on July 11, 2001 dealing in detail with a detailed labor 
migrant recruitment. It included individual examination of the application by the member 
state connected to factors such as labor market demand and failed attempt for recruiting local 
or EU citizens for this position. The main opponents of the directive were Germany and 
Austria, which were afraid of losing their sovereignty over labor market access. 
Menz describes the German employers organizations (BDA) as an important actor for the 
policy of resistance toward the directive. They were afraid of losing their influence over this 
topic and the national regulations aiming at highly skilled workers. Therefore, it 
„communicated its preference to the Ministry of Interior“ (ibid., p. 14). 
Although the Commission withdrew its proposal in 2003, the Italian presidency „revived 
the negotiations by suggesting a common EU labor approach“ (ibid., p115). An example 
for this was the labor migration quotas by Italy. Quotas were supposed to be a tool for 
negotiations with the sending countries and the exact national quota was to be determined by 
the national authority. Due to resistence from member states (e.g. Germany) the idea for 
general regulation over the procedures and conditions for admission of immigrants was 
abandoned (ibid., p. 118). In this case we could say that there was no convergence of interests 
between the states and therefore the agreement did not take place (see liberal 
intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik). 
7.2 Southern vs. Northern Europe 
Although there is often rhetoric about tough controls of irregular migration, the 
implementation of these policies is very complex. The member states have different 
approaches to dealing with irregular migration. Southern European countries launched 
large-scale regularization programmes. Compared to this, Northern European countries 
made smaller-scale regularization programmes and did not support the dimensions of 
regularizations undertaken by countries like Spain, Greece and Italy (Boswell / Geddes, 
2011, p.143; see also Reyneri, 2003; Reyneri, 1998). 
                                                 
31 COM (2000) 757 final 
 95 
Boswell / Geddes describe five factors that could influence the divergence between law 
and practice (2011, p.143): 
- Labor market structure. The bigger the informal economy is, the higher the possibility 
for inserting irregular migrants  
- How people perceive ("sanctity") the law – if they respect it or they try to be pragmatic 
- Timing. The administrative capacity of the country might be less developed if it is a new 
country of immigration 
- Asylum policy. If the failed asylum applicants stay on the territory of the states they may 
become irregular migrants 
- Admission policies. If the policies provide labor which replaces the need of irregular 
migrants (see also Guiraudon / Joppke, 2001, p.11) 
7.3 EU, labor migrants and irregular migrants 
7.3.1 Overview 
Between 1943 and 1973 the labor migration in Northern Europe came mainly from 
Central and Eastern European countries. These people come as refugees and filled the 
losses following the war. They contributed to the post-war boom. In the 1970 the 
migration from the South reached its peak: 
"…over 700 000 new foreign workers entered the Federal Republic of Germany 
(nearly 125 000 from Turkey and over 200 000 from Yugoslavia) and over 300 000 
(of which 140 000 from Spain) entered France" (Böhning in Düvell / Jordan 2002, 
p. 39) 
 
These countries tried to restrict the immigration through bilateral agreements for 
recruiting workers, but only half of those entered were recruited in this way. The oil crisis 
of 1973 slowed down the economies in Europe and was followed by measures for 
reducing the migration flow. Although this period is described as "zero immigration" 
because of the decrease in the migrant recruitment, migration continued in the form of 
family reunion (ibid.). In the 1980s Spain, Greece and Portugal entered the Community 
and received returning labor migrants as well as migrants from outside the European 
Community. 
The creation of the single market provided conditions for the movement of workers within 
the European Community. Düvell / Jordan say that the migration from the poorer 
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periphery to the richer centre was declining in the 1980s. Workers in the North were going 
more often back to their home countries – e.g. Southern European countries (2002, p. 36). 
This was partly because of the changes in the political freedoms and social rights in Spain, 
Greece and Portugal, and partly because of the EU policy for redistributing resources to 
poorer regions (ibid.). At that time, the migration flows were already coming from outside 
the EU. This was related to the new world political situation – the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus. In addition to that, the 
globalization and the new geopolitical order in the developing countries contributed to the 
increase in migration (Düvell / Jordan 2002, p. 37). 
 
Two problems 
Schierup connects two issues to migration. The first one is the restructuring of the welfare 
state. This leads to social exclusion of certain population groups. Connected to this are 
e.g. problems of unemployment, shrinking social assistance, poverty among young people 
and feminization of poverty (Schierup, 2006, p.1). In many cases the socially excluded 
tend to be people with a migration background. Examples for this are the undocumented 
migrants working irregularly in agriculture, in building sites or as family carers, which are 
deprived of social, political and civic rights. Asylum seekers living in detention camps or 
working irregularly are also excluded from the welfare state. The second one is 
transformation of the nation and the established identities. Populism uses the social crisis 
as a reason for the exclusion of people not belonging to the nation on a cultural or 
religious basis (Schierup, 2004, p.3). Such trends can be seen in France (the party of Jean 
Marie Le Pen), in Austria (Jörg Haider, Freedom Party) and in Italy (Berlusconi). This 
leads to tightening rules for immigration, asylum rules and the societal incorporation of 
immigrants. Populism stimulates fears connected with migration issues and sees the 
solutions in building frontiers, e.g. building barriers on free labor mobility, which leads to 
criminalization and increase in irregular migration. Excluding ethnic minorities from the 
political process and population with migration background from citizenship rights 
jeopardize their integration in society. To the contrary, influential politicians and 
employers point out the need for low and highly skilled workers because of the labor 
market and the demographic decline (Schierup, 2006, p.4). 
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An important aspect is that most irregular migrants have entered e.g. Italy in a regular way 
but overstayed. On one hand, visas were regulated by the Schengen rules, and on the 
other, Italy had treaties for seasonal workers.    
Labor market regulation 
Düvell / Jordan point out that even in the high-wage and regulated market, it was possible 
for irregular migrants to enter informal economy. The less regulated markets provided 
even more possibilities for evading the internal controls (2002, p.56). As a whole they see 
the problem in the "overregulation of the European economies, the over-generosity of 
their welfare systems, and the excessive costs of social insurance contribution" (p.58). 
This is seen as making countries' economies less dynamic. 
7.3.2 Domestic workers 
The breadwinner model accepted men as the main earners of the family. Women were 
perceived as second earners until the early 1970s, when the focus of labor-market policies 
shifted to the service sector and toward the employment of women (Düvell / Jordan, 2002, 
p. 65). The involvement of women in the labor market created the need for domestic 
workers who take care of children, older people, cleaning and etc. The two-earner model 
was established in many countries, but countries like Germany and France decided to have 
low rates of female participation and private sector growth and in this way they sacrificed 
the employment growth (p.67). The usual domestic worker is female, young and from a 
certain ethnicity. The authors claim that in the case of domestic labor, it is very difficult to 
make difference between the categories of migration (chosen / forced, legal / irregular 
etc.). This kind of work is difficult to regulate and the workers are often very vulnerable to 
personal and sexual abuse (p.68).  
7.3.3 Restrictive policies and smuggling 
A result from restrictive policies 
An unintended consequence of restrictive policies is that migrants prefer to contact 
smugglers instead of taking the risks to cross borders on their own. According to 
Koslowsky the number of people using smugglers' 'services' has increased in comparison 
to the number of asylum-seekers (in Guiraudon / Joppke,  2001, p.108). 
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Historical context for smuggling 
After the Second World War the welfare state was seen as "a crucial factor in shaping 
responses to immigration and settlement" and it aimed at eliminination of mass insecurity 
and poverty. The new development of the immigration in the 1990s – the increase of the 
number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants shaped perceptions and policies. Welfare 
policies can cause inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. Schierup defines undocumented 
immigrants as people coming from less developed countries looking for jobs. They are in 
most cases young and highly educated in their country of origin, but get an unskilled job 
in the receiving country. Trafficking of irregular migrants is perceived as a crime. 
Political discussions as well as the media panic urge for more controlled borders 
(Schierup, 2006). 
Immigration control and external borders 
In the beginning of the 1990s restrictive measures on mobility were introduced. They 
were justified with the fears of uncontrolled immigration to European Community coming 
from poorer and less stable countries and some xenophobic actions (e.g. attacks on 
asylum-seekers in Germany in the early 1990s). This was followed by attempts to 
coordinate the development of border control regimes, to harmonize visa policies and 
asylum and admission aspects. On the other hand, the EU began negotiations with sending 
and transit countries, which mainly focused on control measures (Düvell / Jordan, 2002, p. 
42). The increasingly restrictive measures and the inequalities between the EU members 
and the sending countries increased the pressure for irregular migration. 
Legal ways for entry vs. smuggling 
Guiraudon and Joppke (2001) describe the current trends of migration flows. On one 
hand, the number of legal immigrants was decreasing. The restrictive policies in Europe 
led to a decline in the number of asylum seekers (in Germany from 438.200 in 1992 to 
116.400 in 1996, p.7). Recruitment was mostly on temporary basis, at the bottom and top 
ends of the skill hierarchy. An example for this is the German "green card", which is 
limited to five years and is not renewable. 
The 1990s were marked by changes in the EU legal framework, which gave more 
possibility for the mobility of EU citizens. At the same time, TCNs still did not have full 
rights for free movement, but there are still legal channels for immigration. In the UK 
there are programmes e.g. for working holidaymakers, seasonal agricultural workers and 
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students which allow legal access. In the case of Germany many families of ethnic 
German origin living in the Soviet bloc were allowed to return. Another possibility was to 
start a procedure for seeking asylum. This was the main focus for tighter control policies 
(Düvell / Jordan, 2002, p.44). Liberal benefit regimes were assumed to attract applicants. 
Member states started adopting measures like dispersed accommodation and fast-track 
procedures. The EU authorities tried to establish common standards for procedures and to 
harmonize asylum regulations (ibid., p.45). In countries with no experience in ethnic 
minority settlements (e.g. camps), there were also some xenophobic attacks. The tougher 
controls made irregular migration more attractive (Guiraudon / Joppke, 2001, p.7). In the 
EU member states there are many citizens, migrants and refugee support organizations 
which oppose the harsh treatment of asylum seekers from poorer countries. Churches also 
play an important role.  
Smuggling and human trafficking 
Irregular migration may be organized in different ways. One possibility is that a certain 
organization or a network can organize the entire smuggling operation, or the smuggling 
services may be bought on the way to their destination (Portes / DeWind, p.294). The 
authors describe a few cases of smuggling. In the first case, a person stays at the railway 
station in Prague and searches for possible "clients" to bring them to the German border 
by car. Then they cross the border by foot. In the other cases, an important role is played 
by foreigners who have lived longer in Western countries for a longer period. The process 
may be propelled by ethnic and kin ties, but in many cases it is seen as a business with 
"entrepreneurs" and "helpers" (p. 299). The human smugglers' networks are highly 
asymmetrical and centralized. On one hand, they may be characterised by "relationships 
of prestige, mutual sympathy, trust and help; hence they are mutually supportive and 
complementary" (p.300). On the other hand, although there are ethnic ties in some cases, 
relationships of sympathy and help may be absent (ibid.). 
Interaction between law enforcement and smugglers 
Heckmann points out that law enforcement institutions and smugglers are always 
competing. The institutions try to introduce measures for stopping this process and 
smugglers want to avoid this. Among the main law enforcement measures are "an increase 
in financial means and personnel for border control, an increase in material and 
technological resources; changes in legislation and administrative rules; and cooperation 
with other cases and training of their personnel" (Portes / DeWind, p.303). Smugglers try 
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to adapt through changing routes, increasing the use of technologies, professionalization 
and specialization, improvement of recruitment and "services", special fees for certain 
groups and attempts to corrupt state officials (ibid.). Heckmann calls the competition 
between law enforcement institutions and smuggling an arms race. But he does not 
assume that there will soon be an exhaustion of the competitors (ibid.). 
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Conclusion 
This work looked at different theories trying to explain migration and why it happens. Still 
there is not one universal theory which could explain this process, but it is connected to 
complex factors existing in the receiving country as well as in the sending country. The 
situation in Europe is special because the EU also wants to have a say in this field. 
Ideas about the free movement of people arise with the Rome Treaties in 1957. 
International treaties regulated this question. They were not part of the acquis communitaire. 
The Schengen Intergovernmental Treaty established an area whose external border controls 
were strengthened. Visas for third country nationals are to be requested in the signatory states 
and air carriers can be sanctioned if they accept people without proper visas. Another 
international treaty is the 1990 Dublin Convention which co-ordinates the processing of 
asylum applications in different countries. 
The EU member states are not ready to easily give up their sovereignty over migration issues 
and it is important that migration policy has different dimensions. With the Treaty of 
Maastricht migration issues were separated in the first and third pillar. Visum policy went in 
the first pillar, where decisions were taken at supranational level, and issues about refugees, 
(irregular) immigration and third country nationals went in the third pillar where decision are 
taken with unanimity. This means that member states can still regulate these areas at national 
level. The tendency to suprnationalism goes further with the Treaty of Amsterdam which 
moves some issues to the first pillar, but still decision on external border controls, permissions 
for refugees and immigrants followed the unanimity principle. Important aspects were the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure for adoption of directives and regulations on 
immigration policy and the incorporation of the Schengen Treaty in the acquis communitaire. 
Afterwards, the Tampere programme and the open method for co-ordination came, which 
were supposed to help translating political goals into concrete actions. 
The fight against irregular migration became priority for the EU after the observed 
increase in the irregular migration and the events of September 11, 2001. The subsequent 
action plans are criticized by some authors because they state objectives, but in many 
cases they do not specify means for reaching them. The Lisbon Treaty is also important 
because it introduced the solidarity principle and qualified majority voting on immigration 
and asylum issues. 
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National actors can influence policy through informal lobbying. Unions and employers’ 
organizations in Germany have more influence compared to humanitarian NGOs which 
have financial and organizational difficulties. The government plays a major role and it 
supports stringent procedures, which could reduce the attractivity of asylum. In Italy 
migration policy depends to a large extent on the political position of the ruling party. The 
Left is more liberal and the Right is restrictive. Furthermore, it happens more often that 
irregular migrants are excluded from society and social services. They are often a 
scapegoat for social problems and face populism and hostility.  
After the Second World War and with the erection of the Berlin Wall Germany needed more 
labor force. Guest workers came from Turkey, Italy and Tunisia. They were seen as 
temporarily residing and had no political rights and separate social insurances. Restrictions on 
immigration were introduced in the 1970s and the 1980s with the halt on labor recruiting 
(Anwerbestopp). With the increase in immigration in the 1990s the government added 
more conditions for entry for the category of Aussiedler e.g. language tests. 
Due to labor shortages Germany needs migrant labor, but the authorities looked at 
migration as temporary for a long time. An important issue is that Germany was not accepting 
itself as country of immigration. Germany had Foreigners’ Law until 2004 when it was 
changed to Immigration Law. This showed that the country was finally aware that it was a 
country of immigartion. The law had measures aiming at highly skilled immigrants and was 
supporting the recruitement halt from the 1970s. The report of the expert commission 
Süssmuth also payed attention to the qualified immigrants. As a whole, there is a tendency to 
restricting the entry of some migrant groups, but there is selectivity and highly skilled 
migrants are preferred. National actors also influence policy. Depending on their internal 
organizational structure their influence is different. Humanitarian NGOs influence through 
soft skills, employers’ organizations favor quotas on legal labor migration and the government 
is interested in different types of labor migration, but would like to decrease the number of 
asylum-seekers. 
The number of irregular migrants in Germany in 2010 was around 50.250 persons. If 
asylum seeking is seen as a successful attempt to enter the country, the number may rise. 
There is also a possibility that after a rejected application the asylum-seekers do not leave the 
country and become irregular. Although the size of the informal economy in Germany can 
hardly be compared with that in Italy, there are still possibilities for informal employment. 
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This may concern irregular migrants, asylum-seekers waiting for application results and 
regular entrants without work permit.  
The recent legislation on migration in Italy is perceived as restrictive with legalization 
campaigns for irregular immigrants. The Law of 1986 focused on restrictive border controls, 
integration of migrants communities and labor migration regulations. The 1990 Martelli Law 
continued that focus of the migration policy. Implementation of the laws is often criticized as 
well as local administrations which have freedom in their implementation. An example for 
this is the residence card introduced with the 1998 Turco-Napolitano Law. It was supposed to 
give migrants access to the welfare system, but due to restrictive interpretations a small 
number of migrants received it. The introduced quota system for labor migrants was 
connected with the arrests of irregular migrants from the partner countries. The restrictive 
trend continued with the 2002 Bossi-Fini Law when obtaining a residence permit was linked 
to the possession of a work permit. Legalization programmes were the easiest way to legalize 
immigrants, but they are not a long-term solution and in some cases they can attract even 
more irregular migrants. 
Crossing the borders in an irregular way by boat, at airports or at ports is one way to become 
irregular. According to statistics, about 60-75% of the irregular immigrants in Italy are 
overstayers. One of the reasons for the big interest of irregular migrants is the geographic 
position. The Italian-Slovenian border is one of the main entry channels, the Italian-French 
border is mainly crossed by Africans which entered Europe through Spain or France and the 
Southern borders are often reached by boats with people coming from Yugoslavia and 
Albania. The Milano airport is also an entry channel for irregular immigrants. 
Labor market specifics and underground economy also attract migration flows. The level 
of unemployment in Italy is about 12 percent. This is due to the fact that Italians are not 
willing to take less paid jobs. Immigrants from the third world are ready to take them. This 
happens mainly in sectors like agriculture, services, cleaning, reataurants and retail trade. 
Most often irregular migrants are hired in small and family firms. 
Another aspect are the regional differences in Italy. The South is significantly poorer than 
the North. Employers in the North are actively recruiting labor force. Therefore, 75 percent of 
undocumented migrants are in Northern and Central Italy. 
Germany and Italy rely on pre-entry measures for preventing migration. Both of them account 
on co-operation with the sending countries. Germany has treaties for recruitment of workers 
as well as for preventing irregular migration. Italy has agreements on readmission and 
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mangement of migration flows with sending countries. Awareness and information campaigns 
are important for both countries in order to prevent irregular migration. Italy also uses 
preferential quotas which are connected to the needs of the labor market and the 
unemployment rate. 
The Schengen Border Code states that each member state is responsible for the fight 
against irregular migration. An important role for external border controls in Germany and 
Italy is that of  the EU agency FRONTEX. According to its reports, the borders most exposed 
to irregular migration are land and sea borders in South-Eastern Europe and air borders in 
Western and Northern Europe. Both Germany and Italy are co-operating in this 
framework. 
After detection of an irregular stay in the country there are a few possibilities for action. 
Italy prefers mass regularization. With the last regularization in 2009 about 230.000 persons 
received a residence permit. Germany does not support that type of regularizations and 
conducts individual legalizations on very rare occasions (in this master thesis, p. 52). 
Voluntary return is another measure against irregular immigration. The Italian and 
German governments provide assistance in this case. In addition to that, after the repatriation 
there is no bar against returning to Italy. The EU Return Directive sets one procedure for 
expulsion of irregular immigrants.  
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Measures against irregular migration comprise border controlls as well as regulations of 
labor market and co-operation with the sending countries. 
H1: The hypothesis was confirmed. But still it is not comprehensive because there might be 
also additional factors influencing these measures such as regional differences inside the 
country, actors at the national level and welfare state. 
H2: The approaches of Germany and Italy (both of them EU member states) towards irregular 
migrants differ due to their different experience in this field, their different labor market and 
their geographical position. 
H2: The hypothesis was partially confirmed. As a new country of immigration one of the 
most common, but short-term measures in Italy are mass regularizations. Due to its 
geographical position Italy is exposed to irregular migratory flows entering through the sea, 
land and air borders. Germany mainly pays attention to land and air borders. Regulations of 
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the official labor market exist, but as long as the undeground market attracts and employs a 
big part of irregular migrants and it remains unregulated, the stricter border measures are not 
be enough to prevent irregular migration. Country specifics play a significant role. The 
establishment of the two earners model in Italy caused a demand for domestic workers, who 
are most often irregular female migrants. Numbers of irregular migrants vary in the different 
regions according to the possibilities for work.  
H3: In the field of migration states still want to keep their sovereignty and are unwilling to 
delegate all their powers to the EU. 
H3: The hypothesis is partially confirmed. It is difficult to speak for migration as a whole. In 
same cases EU member states are willing to establish common standards as is the case with 
the Return Directive. In other cases, they prefer to deal with the question at national level, e.g. 
the failed Labor Migration Directive. 
Measures against irregular migration at the national level are important as well as 
measures at the EU level. The European Commission set policy priorities for the fight against 
„illegal“ migration in 2006, and in 2008 the Return Directive was adopted, establishing one 
common procedure for the expulsion of irregular migrants. The EU agency FRONTEX plays 
also an important role in the cooperation between countries for protection of borders. And still 
member states do not want to give up their sovereignty. This is shown through the 
example of the failure of the Labor Migration Directive. 
Another aspect of irregular migration is smuggling. Smugglers help irregular migrants on 
their way of to the aimed country. The EU has taken steps towards development of border 
control regimes, harmonization of visa policies and asylum and admission policies. But the 
more complicated and restricitive procedures for entry become, the more creative smugglers 
become. Therefore, it is important to also pay attention to other measures such as cooperation 
with the sending countries. 
Out of the theories discussed in Chapter 2, each explains some particular aspect of 
migration. On the whole, some of them are more suited than others to explain the specific 
situation in the EU. A combination of economic and social theories may provide a good 
basis for a more complete analysis. 
The economic theories of Section 2.1 (neoclassical theory, new economics of labour 
migration and dual labour market theory) do not look at the EU as one entity – rather, they 
focus on specifics in the sending or receiving state. Neoclassical theory puts an emphasis 
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on the push-pull model. Its predictions for a wage fall after an increase in labour supply in 
the receiving country are not true in the EU, as far as Germany and Italy are concerned. 
The assumptions at the micro level can also be disputed. Migration is not always a 
decision of the individual on its own, in some communities the family has an important 
role for such decisions. Although the labour market in Germany and Italy attracts 
migrants, factors like wars and political instabilities can also cause migration (e.g. 
migration from the former Yugoslavia to Germany in the 1990s and from Northern Africa 
to Italy in 2011 and 2012). Furthermore, the theory cannot explain why certain groups 
have a preference to move particularly to Germany or Italy, e.g. Turks in the first case and 
Albanians in the second case. A more general weakness of neoclassical theory is that 
individuals do not have full information about wages and employment opportunities in the 
receiving state.  
New economics of labour migration claims that families and households take decisions for 
migration, which explains one aspect of migration to Germany and Italy. Again, the claim 
that from a certain moment there will be no more wage difference has not proven true. In 
accordance with the theory, Italy and Germany try to influence migration not just through 
labour market policies, but also through different kinds of cooperation with the sending 
countries. The theory gives some good points for discussion, but as a whole it does not 
seem to explain the situation in the EU sufficiently. 
Among the economic theories discussed here, the dual labour market theory reflects the 
situation in Germany and Italy best. Firstly, European countries have a demand for people 
willing to work in badly paid and insecure jobs, which are avoided by the local 
population. Secondly, people fleeing from poor regions are ready to take these jobs. 
Thirdly, there are also job opportunities for highly skilled foreign workers (cf. the results 
of the Süssmuth Commission). This scenario matches the dual labour market theory. 
However, like the two previous ones, this theory concentrates on the economic aspects of 
migration, largely disregarding other aspects. 
Social theories like the ones discussed in Section 2.2 (migration networks theory, 
migration systems theory and institutional theory) explain a different aspect of the 
migration issue. Migration networks were important for migration to Germany in the 20th 
century. After the halt on recruitment in the 1970s family reunion was the most common 
way for immigration. Although there are cases of family reunion in Italy, it is not a mass 
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phenomenon because of the restrictive legislation on this question. Migration networks 
theory is a good complement to economic theories, since it explains a particular aspect 
that they disregard.  
In a similar way, the narrow aspect covered by institutional theory is highly relevant in 
Germany and Italy. Smuggling organizations are present in both countries. The more 
restrictions on migration are introduced and the more consistently they are implemented, 
the more demand exists for smuggling. On the other hand, humanitarian organizations in 
Germany and Italy provide help for migrants like counselling, legal help and social 
services. 
Migration systems theory is a particularly good complement to the economic theories 
because it considers prior links between the receiving and sending countries. This explains 
why Turks have a preference to migrate particularly to Germany. In accordance with the 
theory, migrants can use the help of relatives already settled in the receiving country or 
employers’ recruitment activities. The theory also reflects how Italy and Germany try to 
control migration through their legislation and practices and how humanitarian NGOs or 
smuggler organizations contribute to migration. 
Finally, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism discussed in Section 1 is of central 
significance for a complete analysis of migration in the EU. The theory explains how 
integration of member-states policies goes further when national preferences coincide. 
One example for this is the Return Directive, which was adopted in 2008, establishing one 
standard for the expulsion of irregular migrants. A few years earlier the proposed Labour 
Migration Directive was rejected due to the opposition of Germany and Austria, who 
wanted to regulate access to their labour markets on their own. This was partly due to 
national actors’ resistance to the directive. According to Menz, lobby groups in Germany 
have significant influence on the migration policy. Depending on their organizational 
structure they can exert stronger or weaker influence on shaping a certain policy. Menz 
states that employers’ organizations have more influence than humanitarian NGOs, 
because they have a better structure and communicate their ideas better. Migration policy 
in Italy strongly depends on the ruling political party. This is consistent with Moravcsik’s 
statement that national policies and past legacies of the member states are important for 
governments’ positions at the EU level. Although he does not deny the importance of 
institutions, he sees governments as the main players. Since governments are not ready to 
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give up their sovereignty in migration related questions (e.g. irregular migration, labour 
migration, smuggling, asylum seeking etc.), but adhere to their particular national 
preferences on these topics, integration of their policies proceeds in a different way for the 
different topics. 
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